/// <summary>
/// Activates an identity key within the TPM device.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="encryptedKey">The encrypted identity key.</param>
public override void ActivateIdentityKey(byte[] encryptedKey)
{
if (Logging.IsEnabled)
{
Logging.Enter(this, $"{encryptedKey}", nameof(ActivateIdentityKey));
}
Destroy();
// Take the pieces out of the container
var m = new Marshaller(encryptedKey, DataRepresentation.Tpm);
Tpm2bIdObject cred2b = m.Get <Tpm2bIdObject>();
byte[] encryptedSecret = new byte[m.Get <ushort>()];
encryptedSecret = m.GetArray <byte>(encryptedSecret.Length, "encryptedSecret");
TpmPrivate dupBlob = m.Get <TpmPrivate>();
byte[] encWrapKey = new byte[m.Get <ushort>()];
encWrapKey = m.GetArray <byte>(encWrapKey.Length, "encWrapKey");
UInt16 pubSize = m.Get <UInt16>();
_idKeyPub = m.Get <TpmPublic>();
byte[] cipherText = new byte[m.Get <ushort>()];
cipherText = m.GetArray <byte>(cipherText.Length, "uriInfo");
// Setup the authorization session for the EK
var policyNode = new TpmPolicySecret(TpmHandle.RhEndorsement, false, 0, Array.Empty <byte>(), Array.Empty <byte>());
var policy = new PolicyTree(_ekPub.nameAlg);
policy.SetPolicyRoot(policyNode);
AuthSession ekSession = _tpm2.StartAuthSessionEx(TpmSe.Policy, _ekPub.nameAlg);
ekSession.RunPolicy(_tpm2, policy);
// Perform the activation
ekSession.Attrs &= ~SessionAttr.ContinueSession;
_activationSecret = _tpm2[Array.Empty <byte>(), ekSession].ActivateCredential(
new TpmHandle(TPM_20_SRK_HANDLE),
new TpmHandle(TPM_20_EK_HANDLE),
cred2b.credential,
encryptedSecret);
TpmPrivate importedKeyBlob = _tpm2.Import(
new TpmHandle(TPM_20_SRK_HANDLE),
_activationSecret,
_idKeyPub,
dupBlob,
encWrapKey,
new SymDefObject(TpmAlgId.Aes, 128, TpmAlgId.Cfb));
_idKeyHandle = _tpm2.Load(new TpmHandle(TPM_20_SRK_HANDLE), importedKeyBlob, _idKeyPub);
// Persist the key in NV
TpmHandle hmacKeyHandle = new TpmHandle(AIOTH_PERSISTED_KEY_HANDLE);
_tpm2.EvictControl(new TpmHandle(TpmRh.Owner), _idKeyHandle, hmacKeyHandle);
// Unload the transient copy from the TPM
_tpm2.FlushContext(_idKeyHandle);
_idKeyHandle = hmacKeyHandle;
if (Logging.IsEnabled)
{
Logging.Exit(this, $"{encryptedKey}", nameof(ActivateIdentityKey));
}
}
void ActivateAikSample(Tpm2 tpm, TestContext testCtx)
{
// Use an RSA primary key in the Endorsement hierarchy (EK) to 'activate'
// another primary in the Endorsement hierarchy (AIK).
// Note: this procedure can be used to activate a key in the Storage hierarchy, too.
// "Activation" means secure passing sensitive data generated by a CA (e.g.
// a symmetric key protecting a freshly generated certificate), so that only
// a device with the TPM owning the target AIK and EK can access these data.
// Create a primary key that we will certify.
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// Device side code
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// Name algorithm of the new AIK
TpmAlgId nameAlg = TpmAlgId.Sha256;
// The key to be certified needs a policy. It can be ANY policy, but here
// it is configured to allow AIK usage only with the following commands
var policyAIK = new PolicyTree(nameAlg);
var policyOR = new TpmPolicyOr();
policyAIK.SetPolicyRoot(policyOR);
policyOR.AddPolicyBranch(new TpmPolicyCommand(TpmCc.ActivateCredential, "Activate"));
policyOR.AddPolicyBranch(new TpmPolicyCommand(TpmCc.Certify, "Certify"));
policyOR.AddPolicyBranch(new TpmPolicyCommand(TpmCc.CertifyCreation, "CertifyCreation"));
policyOR.AddPolicyBranch(new TpmPolicyCommand(TpmCc.Quote, "Quote"));
var inAIKPub = new TpmPublic(nameAlg,
ObjectAttr.Restricted | ObjectAttr.Sign | ObjectAttr.FixedParent | ObjectAttr.FixedTPM
| ObjectAttr.AdminWithPolicy | ObjectAttr.SensitiveDataOrigin,
policyAIK.GetPolicyDigest(),
new RsaParms(new SymDefObject(), new SchemeRsassa(TpmAlgId.Sha256), 2048, 0),
new Tpm2bPublicKeyRsa());
TpmPublic AIKpub;
var inSens = new SensitiveCreate(Substrate.RandomAuth(nameAlg), null);
CreationData creationData;
byte[] creationHash;
TkCreation creationTk;
TpmHandle hAIK = tpm.CreatePrimary(TpmRh.Endorsement, inSens, inAIKPub, null, null, out AIKpub,
out creationData, out creationHash, out creationTk);
// An alternative using test substrate helper
//TpmHandle hAIK = Substrate.CreatePrimary(tpm, inAIKPub, TpmRh.Endorsement);
// Normally a device would have a pre-provisioned persistent EK with the above handle
TpmHandle hEK = new TpmHandle(0x81010001);
// Get its public part
TpmPublic EKpub = null;
// In a test environment the real EK may be absent. In this case use
// a primary key temporarily created in the Endorsement hierarchy.
byte[] name, qname;
tpm._AllowErrors()
.ReadPublic(hEK, out name, out qname);
if (!tpm._LastCommandSucceeded())
{
var inEKpub = new TpmPublic(TpmAlgId.Sha256,
ObjectAttr.Restricted | ObjectAttr.Decrypt | ObjectAttr.FixedParent | ObjectAttr.FixedTPM
| ObjectAttr.AdminWithPolicy | ObjectAttr.SensitiveDataOrigin,
new byte[] { 0x83, 0x71, 0x97, 0x67, 0x44, 0x84, 0xb3, 0xf8,
0x1a, 0x90, 0xcc, 0x8d, 0x46, 0xa5, 0xd7, 0x24,
0xfd, 0x52, 0xd7, 0x6e, 0x06, 0x52, 0x0b, 0x64,
0xf2, 0xa1, 0xda, 0x1b, 0x33, 0x14, 0x69, 0xaa },
new RsaParms(new SymDefObject(TpmAlgId.Aes, 128, TpmAlgId.Cfb), null, 2048, 0),
new Tpm2bPublicKeyRsa());
inSens = new SensitiveCreate(null, null);
hEK = tpm.CreatePrimary(TpmRh.Endorsement, inSens, inEKpub, null, null, out EKpub,
out creationData, out creationHash, out creationTk);
}
// Marshal public parts of AIK and EK
byte[] AIKpubBytes = AIKpub.GetTpmRepresentation();
byte[] EKpubBytes = EKpub.GetTpmRepresentation();
// Here the device uses network to pass AIKpubBytes and EKpubBytes (as well as
// the EK certificate) to CA service.
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// Service (CA) side code
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// Unmarshal AIKpub and EKpub (and EK certificate)
var m = new Marshaller(AIKpubBytes);
AIKpub = m.Get <TpmPublic>();
m = new Marshaller(EKpubBytes);
EKpub = m.Get <TpmPublic>();
// Symmetric key to be used by CA to encrypt the new certificate it creates for AIK
byte[] secretKey = Substrate.RandomBytes(32);
// Here CA does the following (the sample does not show this code):
// - Validates EK certificate
// - Generates a new certificate for AIK (AIKcert)
// - Encrypts AIKcert with secretKey
// Create an activation blob
// Internal wrapper key encrypted with EKpub to be used by TPM2_ActivateCredential() command.
byte[] encSecret;
// An encrypted and HMACed object tied to the destination TPM. It contains
// 'secret' to be extracted by the successful TPM2_ActivateCredential() command
// (that can only succeeed on the TPM that originated both EK and AIK).
IdObject certInfo;
// Run TSS.Net equivalent of TPM2_MakeCredential() command (convenient for the server side,
// as it will likely be faster than the TPM transaction and allows concurrent execution).
certInfo = EKpub.CreateActivationCredentials(secretKey, AIKpub.GetName(), out encSecret);
// Marshal certInfo
// IdObject data type requires customized marshaling
m = new Marshaller();
m.Put(certInfo.integrityHMAC.Length, "integrityHMAC.Length");
m.Put(certInfo.integrityHMAC, "integrityHMAC");
m.Put(certInfo.encIdentity.Length, "encIdentity");
m.Put(certInfo.encIdentity, "encIdentity.Length");
byte[] certInfoBytes = m.GetBytes();
// Here the CA passes certInfoBytes and encSecret (as well as the encrypted
// AIK certificate) back to the device via network.
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// Device side code again
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// Unmarshal certInfo and encSecret (and encrypted AIK certificate)
m = new Marshaller(certInfoBytes);
int len = m.Get <int>();
certInfo.integrityHMAC = m.GetArray <byte>(len);
len = m.Get <int>();
certInfo.encIdentity = m.GetArray <byte>(len);
// encSecret is a byte array, so, normally, no special unmarshalling is required
// Create policy session to authorize AIK usage
AuthSession sessAIK = tpm.StartAuthSessionEx(TpmSe.Policy, nameAlg);
sessAIK.RunPolicy(tpm, policyAIK, "Activate");
// Create policy description and corresponding policy session to authorize EK usage
var policyEK = new PolicyTree(EKpub.nameAlg);
policyEK.SetPolicyRoot(new TpmPolicySecret(TpmRh.Endorsement, false, 0, null, null));
AuthSession sessEK = tpm.StartAuthSessionEx(TpmSe.Policy, EKpub.nameAlg);
sessEK.RunPolicy(tpm, policyEK);
byte[] recoveredSecretKey = tpm[sessAIK, sessEK].ActivateCredential(hAIK, hEK, certInfo, encSecret);
testCtx.AssertEqual("Secret.1", recoveredSecretKey, secretKey);
// Here the device can use recoveredSecretKey to decrypt the AIK certificate
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// End of activation sequence
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Now prepare activation using the TPM built-in command
//
byte[] encSecret2 = null;
IdObject certInfo2 = tpm.MakeCredential(hEK, secretKey, AIKpub.GetName(), out encSecret2);
// Reinitialize policy sessions
tpm.PolicyRestart(sessAIK);
sessAIK.RunPolicy(tpm, policyAIK, "Activate");
tpm.PolicyRestart(sessEK);
sessEK.RunPolicy(tpm, policyEK);
recoveredSecretKey = tpm[sessAIK, sessEK].ActivateCredential(hAIK, hEK, certInfo2, encSecret2);
testCtx.AssertEqual("Secret.2", recoveredSecretKey, secretKey);
// Cleanup
tpm.FlushContext(sessAIK);
tpm.FlushContext(sessEK);
tpm.FlushContext(hAIK);
if (hEK.handle != 0x81010001)
{
tpm.FlushContext(hEK);
}
} // ActivateAikSample
/// <summary>
/// Activates a symmetric identity within the Hardware Security Module.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="activation">The authentication challenge key supplied by the service.</param>
public override void ActivateSymmetricIdentity(byte[] activation)
{
Destroy();
// Take the pieces out of the container
var m = new Marshaller(activation, DataRepresentation.Tpm);
byte[] credentialBlob = new byte[m.Get <ushort>()];
credentialBlob = m.GetArray <byte>(credentialBlob.Length, "credentialBlob");
byte[] encryptedSecret = new byte[m.Get <ushort>()];
encryptedSecret = m.GetArray <byte>(encryptedSecret.Length, "encryptedSecret");
TpmPrivate dupBlob = m.Get <TpmPrivate>();
byte[] encWrapKey = new byte[m.Get <ushort>()];
encWrapKey = m.GetArray <byte>(encryptedSecret.Length, "encWrapKey");
UInt16 pubSize = m.Get <UInt16>();
_idKeyPub = m.Get <TpmPublic>();
byte[] cipherText = new byte[m.Get <ushort>()];
cipherText = m.GetArray <byte>(cipherText.Length, "uriInfo");
// Setup the authorization session for the EK
var policyNode = new TpmPolicySecret(
TpmHandle.RhEndorsement, _ekAuth ?? Array.Empty <byte>(),
new AuthValue(),
false,
0,
Array.Empty <byte>(),
Array.Empty <byte>());
var policy = new PolicyTree(_ekPub.nameAlg);
policy.SetPolicyRoot(policyNode);
AuthSession ekSession = _tpm2.StartAuthSessionEx(TpmSe.Policy, _ekPub.nameAlg);
ekSession.RunPolicy(_tpm2, policy);
// Perform the activation
ekSession.Attrs &= ~SessionAttr.ContinueSession;
_activationSecret = _tpm2[Array.Empty <byte>(), ekSession].ActivateCredential(
new TpmHandle(TPM_20_SRK_HANDLE),
new TpmHandle(TPM_20_EK_HANDLE),
credentialBlob,
encryptedSecret);
TpmPrivate importedKeyBlob = _tpm2.Import(
new TpmHandle(TPM_20_SRK_HANDLE),
_activationSecret,
_idKeyPub,
dupBlob,
encWrapKey,
new SymDefObject(TpmAlgId.Aes, 128, TpmAlgId.Cfb));
_idKeyHandle = _tpm2.Load(new TpmHandle(TPM_20_SRK_HANDLE), importedKeyBlob, _idKeyPub);
// Persist the key in NV
TpmHandle hmacKeyHandle = new TpmHandle(AIOTH_PERSISTED_KEY_HANDLE);
_tpm2.EvictControl(new TpmHandle(TpmRh.Owner), _idKeyHandle, hmacKeyHandle);
// Unload the transient copy from the TPM
_tpm2.FlushContext(_idKeyHandle);
_idKeyHandle = hmacKeyHandle;
// Unwrap the URI
byte[] clearText = SymmCipher.Decrypt(
new SymDefObject(TpmAlgId.Aes, 128, TpmAlgId.Cfb),
_activationSecret,
new byte[16],
cipherText);
UnicodeEncoding unicode = new UnicodeEncoding();
string uriData = unicode.GetString(clearText);
int idx = uriData.IndexOf('/');
if (idx > 0)
{
string hostName = uriData.Substring(0, idx);
string deviceId = uriData.Substring(idx + 1);
// Persist the URI
ProvisionUri(hostName, deviceId);
}
}
internal virtual void ToHost(Marshaller m)
{
var members = GetFieldsToMarshal(true);
dbg.Indent();
for (int i = 0; i < members.Length; ++i)
{
TpmStructMemberInfo memInfo = members[i];
Type memType = Globs.GetMemberType(memInfo);
var wt = members[i].WireType;
switch(wt)
{
case MarshalType.Union:
{
dbg.Trace("Union " + memType.Name + " with selector " + memInfo.Tag.Value);
memInfo.Value = m.Get(UnionElementFromSelector(memType, memInfo.Tag.Value), memType.Name);
break;
}
case MarshalType.FixedLengthArray:
{
object arr = Globs.GetMember(memInfo, this);
memInfo.Value = m.GetArray(memType.GetElementType(), (arr as Array).Length, memInfo.Name);
break;
}
case MarshalType.VariableLengthArray:
{
int size = m.GetSizeTag(memInfo.SizeLength, memInfo.SizeName);
memInfo.Value = m.GetArray(memType.GetElementType(), size, memInfo.Name);
Debug.Assert(size == ((Array)memInfo.Value).Length);
dbg.Trace("Received Array " + memInfo.Name + " of size " + size);
break;
}
case MarshalType.SizedStruct:
{
int size = m.GetSizeTag(memInfo.SizeLength, memInfo.SizeName);
if (size != 0)
{
memInfo.Value = m.Get(memType, memInfo.Name);
Debug.Assert(size == Marshaller.GetTpmRepresentation(memInfo.Value).Length);
}
dbg.Trace("Received Struct " + memInfo.Name + " of size " + size);
break;
}
default:
// Only attempt unmarshaling a field, if it is not sized or
// if its size is non-zero.
if (memInfo.Tag == null ||
memInfo.Tag.GetValueAsUInt() != 0)
{
memInfo.Value = m.Get(memType, memInfo.Name);
}
break;
}
dbg.Trace((i + 1) + ": " + memInfo.Name + " = " + memInfo.Value);
// Some property values are dynamically obtained from their linked fields.
// Correspondingly, they do not have a setter, so we bypass them here.
Debug.Assert(wt != MarshalType.LengthOfStruct && wt != MarshalType.ArrayCount);
if (wt != MarshalType.UnionSelector)
{
Globs.SetMember(memInfo, this, memInfo.Value);
}
}
dbg.Unindent();
}
/// <summary>
/// Opens a properly-formed TPM command stream into its constituent components.
/// Note: commandParams does NOT include handles.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="command"></param>
/// <param name="header"></param>
/// <param name="handles"></param>
/// <param name="sessions"></param>
/// <param name="commandParms"></param>
public static bool CrackCommand(
byte[] command,
out CommandHeader header,
out TpmHandle[] handles,
out SessionIn[] sessions,
out byte[] commandParms)
{
var m = new Marshaller(command);
header = m.Get<CommandHeader>();
CommandInfo commandInfo = Tpm2.CommandInfoFromCommandCode(header.CommandCode);
if (header.Tag == TpmSt.Null)
{
// A diagnostics command. Pass through unmodified
handles = null;
sessions = null;
commandParms = null;
return false;
}
handles = new TpmHandle[commandInfo.HandleCountIn];
for (int j = 0; j < handles.Length; j++)
{
handles[j] = m.Get<TpmHandle>();
}
// Note sessions are only present if the command tag indicates sessions
if (header.Tag == TpmSt.Sessions)
{
var sessionLength = m.Get<uint>();
uint sessionEnd = m.GetGetPos() + sessionLength;
var inSessions = new List<SessionIn>();
while (m.GetGetPos() < sessionEnd)
{
var s = m.Get<SessionIn>();
inSessions.Add(s);
}
sessions = inSessions.ToArray();
}
else
{
sessions = new SessionIn[0];
}
// And finally parameters
commandParms = m.GetArray<byte>((int)(m.GetValidLength() - m.GetGetPos()));
if (m.GetValidLength() != header.CommandSize)
{
throw new Exception("Command length in header does not match input byte-stream");
}
return true;
}
/// <summary>
/// DispatchMethod is called by auto-generated command action code. It assembles a byte[] containing
/// the formatted TPM command based on the params passed in explicitly, and the sessions currently attached
/// to the TPM object. It processes the TPM response and converts it into an instantiation of the
/// requested object.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="ordinal"></param>
/// <param name="inParms"></param>
/// <param name="expectedResponseType"></param>
/// <param name="outParms"></param>
/// <param name="numInHandlesNotUsed"></param>
/// <param name="numOutHandlesNotUsed"></param>
/// <returns></returns>
internal bool DispatchMethod(
TpmCc ordinal,
TpmStructureBase inParms,
Type expectedResponseType,
out TpmStructureBase outParms,
int numInHandlesNotUsed,
int numOutHandlesNotUsed)
{
outParms = null;
// todo - ClearCommandContext should be moved to the front of this
// routine (and we should make local copies of the context-values we depend upon)
// There are uncaught exceptions that can be generated that would skip
// ClearCOmmandCOntext and leave the Tpm2 with some leftover state.
byte[] response;
if (CurrentCommand != TpmCc.None)
{
OuterCommand = CurrentCommand;
}
CurrentCommand = ordinal;
// The AlternateActionCallback allows alternate processing (or filtering/data
// collection on the executing command stream.
if (TheAlternateActionCallback != null)
{
bool desiredSuccessCode;
bool alternate = TheAlternateActionCallback(ordinal,
inParms,
expectedResponseType,
out outParms,
out desiredSuccessCode);
if (alternate)
{
_ClearCommandContext();
return desiredSuccessCode;
}
}
CommandInfo commandInfo = CommandInfoFromCommandCode(ordinal);
byte[] parms;
TpmHandle[] inHandles;
try
{
// Get the handles and the parameters from the command input structure
CommandProcessor.Fragment(inParms, commandInfo.HandleCountIn, out inHandles, out parms);
// Start processing sessions
PrepareRequestSessions(commandInfo, inHandles);
}
catch (Exception e)
{
Debug.Assert(outParms == null);
if (e is TpmException)
{
if (IsErrorAllowed(((TpmException)e).RawResponse))
{
outParms = (TpmStructureBase)Activator.CreateInstance(expectedResponseType);
}
}
_ClearCommandPrelaunchContext();
_ClearCommandContext();
if (outParms != null)
{
return false;
}
throw;
}
// The caller can install observer/modifier callbacks, and request repeated
// execution of the same command.
bool repeat = false;
byte[] parmsCopy = null;
if (TheCmdParamsCallback != null)
{
parmsCopy = Globs.CopyData(parms);
}
// Response atoms
TpmSt responseTag;
TpmRc resultCode;
uint responseParamSize;
byte[] outParmsNoHandles, outParmsWithHandles;
TpmHandle[] outHandles;
SessionOut[] outSessions;
// In normal processing there is just one pass through this do-while loop
// If command observation/modification callbacks are installed, then the
// caller repeats the command as long as necessary.
bool invokeCallbacks = OuterCommand == TpmCc.None && !CpHashMode && !DoNotDispatchCommand;
do try
{
if (TheCmdParamsCallback != null && invokeCallbacks)
{
parms = Globs.CopyData(parmsCopy);
TheCmdParamsCallback(commandInfo, ref parms, inHandles);
}
// If there are any encrypting sessions then next we encrypt the data in place
parms = DoParmEncryption(parms, commandInfo, 0, Direction.Command);
// Now do the HMAC (note that the handles are needed for name-replacement)
SessionIn[] inSessions = CreateRequestSessions(parms, inHandles);
// CpHashMode is enabled for a single command through tpm.GetCpHash().TpmCommand(...)
if (OuterCommand == TpmCc.None && CpHashMode)
{
CommandParmHash.HashData = GetCommandHash(CommandParmHash.HashAlg, parms, inHandles);
outParms = (TpmStructureBase)Activator.CreateInstance(expectedResponseType);
CpHashMode = false;
_ClearCommandContext();
return true;
}
// Create the command buffer
byte[] command = CommandProcessor.CreateCommand(ordinal, inHandles, inSessions, parms);
// And dispatch the command
Log(ordinal, inParms, 0);
if (DoNotDispatchCommand)
{
CommandBytes = command;
outParms = (TpmStructureBase)Activator.CreateInstance(expectedResponseType);
DoNotDispatchCommand = false;
_ClearCommandContext();
return true;
}
if (TheCmdBufCallback != null && invokeCallbacks)
{
TheCmdBufCallback(ref command);
}
// And actually dispatch the command into the underlying device
DateTime commandSentTime, responseReceivedTime;
int nvRateRecoveryCount = 0;
// No more than 4 retries on NV_RATE error
for (;;)
{
responseReceivedTime = commandSentTime = DateTime.Now;
if (!TestCycleNv)
{
commandSentTime = DateTime.Now;
Device.DispatchCommand(ActiveModifiers, command, out response);
responseReceivedTime = DateTime.Now;
}
else
{
// In TestCycleNv we submit the command with NV not-available. If the TPM indicates that
// NV is not available we re-submit.
try
{
// Once with NV off
Device.SignalNvOff();
Device.DispatchCommand(ActiveModifiers, command, out response);
Device.SignalNvOn();
// And if it did not work, try again with NV on
TpmRc respCode = CommandProcessor.GetResponseCode(response);
if ((uint)respCode == 0x923U || respCode == TpmRc.Lockout)
{
Device.DispatchCommand(ActiveModifiers, command, out response);
}
}
catch (Exception)
{
Device.SignalNvOn();
throw;
}
}
// Convert the byte[] response into its constituent parts.
CommandProcessor.SplitResponse(response,
commandInfo.HandleCountOut,
out responseTag,
out responseParamSize,
out resultCode,
out outHandles,
out outSessions,
out outParmsNoHandles,
out outParmsWithHandles);
if (resultCode != TpmRc.NvRate || ++nvRateRecoveryCount > 4)
{
break;
}
//Console.WriteLine(">>>> NV_RATE: Retrying... Attempt {0}", nvRateRecoveryCount);
Thread.Sleep((int)Tpm2.GetProperty(this, Pt.NvWriteRecovery) + 100);
}
// Invoke the trace callback if installed
if (TheTraceCallback != null)
{
TheTraceCallback(command, response);
}
// Collect basic statistics on command execution
if (TheCmdStatsCallback != null && invokeCallbacks)
{
repeat = TheCmdStatsCallback(ordinal, GetBaseErrorCode(resultCode),
(responseReceivedTime - commandSentTime).TotalSeconds);
}
if (repeat && resultCode == TpmRc.Success)
{
// Update session state
ProcessResponseSessions(outSessions);
int offset = (int)commandInfo.HandleCountOut * 4;
outParmsWithHandles = DoParmEncryption(outParmsWithHandles, commandInfo, offset, Direction.Response);
var m = new Marshaller(outParmsWithHandles);
outParms = (TpmStructureBase)m.Get(expectedResponseType, "");
#if false
m = new Marshaller(command);
TpmSt tag = m.Get<TpmSt>();
uint cmdSize = m.Get<uint>();
TpmCc actualCmd = m.Get<TpmCc>();
var actualHandles = new TpmHandle[inHandles.Length];
for (int i = 0; i < inHandles.Length; ++i)
{
actualHandles[i] = m.Get<TpmHandle>();
}
for (int i = 0; i < inSessions.Length; ++i)
{
m.Get<SessionIn>();
}
var actualParms = m.GetArray<byte>(m.GetValidLength() - m.GetGetPos());
if (m.GetValidLength() != cmdSize)
{
throw new Exception("Command length in header does not match input byte-stream");
}
#endif
CommandHeader actualHeader;
TpmHandle[] actualHandles;
SessionIn[] actualSessions;
byte[] actualParmsBuf;
CommandProcessor.CrackCommand(command, out actualHeader, out actualHandles, out actualSessions, out actualParmsBuf);
m = new Marshaller();
foreach (TpmHandle h in actualHandles)
{
m.Put(h, "handle");
}
m.Put(actualParmsBuf, "parms");
var actualParms = (TpmStructureBase)Activator.CreateInstance(inParms.GetType());
actualParms.ToHost(m);
UpdateHandleData(actualHeader.CommandCode, actualParms, actualHandles, outParms);
//ValidateResponseSessions(outHandles, outSessions, ordinal, resultCode, outParmsNoHandles);
foreach (var h in outHandles)
{
CancelSafeFlushContext(h);
}
} // if (repeat && resultCode == TpmRc.Success)
}
catch (Exception)
{
_ClearCommandPrelaunchContext();
_ClearCommandContext();
throw;
}
while (repeat);
// Update the audit session if needed
if (AuditThisCommand)
{
AuditThisCommand = false;
if (CommandAuditHash == null)
throw new Exception("No audit hash set for this command stream");
byte[] parmHash = GetCommandHash(CommandAuditHash.HashAlg, parms, inHandles);
byte[] expectedResponseHash = GetExpectedResponseHash(CommandAuditHash.HashAlg,
outParmsNoHandles,
ordinal,
resultCode);
CommandAuditHash.Extend(Globs.Concatenate(parmHash, expectedResponseHash));
}
// FlushContest that may be executed as part of _ClearCommandPrelaunchContext()
// must be executed before any command-related info is updated.
_ClearCommandPrelaunchContext();
// Process errors if there are any
bool commandSucceeded = ProcessError(responseTag, responseParamSize, resultCode, inParms);
try
{
if (commandSucceeded)
{
ProcessResponseSessions(outSessions);
int offset = (int)commandInfo.HandleCountOut * 4;
outParmsWithHandles = DoParmEncryption(outParmsWithHandles, commandInfo, offset, Direction.Response);
var mt = new Marshaller(outParmsWithHandles);
outParms = (TpmStructureBase)mt.Get(expectedResponseType, "");
if (TheParamsTraceCallback != null)
{
TheParamsTraceCallback(ordinal, inParms, outParms);
}
UpdateHandleData(ordinal, inParms, inHandles, outParms);
ValidateResponseSessions(outHandles, outSessions, ordinal, resultCode, outParmsNoHandles);
foreach (var s in Sessions) if (s is AuthSession)
{
var sess = s as AuthSession;
if (sess.Attrs.HasFlag(SessionAttr.Audit) && !TpmHandle.IsNull(sess.BindObject))
{
sess.BindObject = TpmRh.Null;
break; // only one audit session is expected
}
}
}
else
{
outParms = (TpmStructureBase)Activator.CreateInstance(expectedResponseType);
}
}
finally
{
// Check in case an exception happened before outParms was initialized
// ReSharper disable once CSharpWarnings::CS0183
if (outParms is TpmStructureBase)
{
Log(ordinal, outParms, 1);
}
// Clear all per-invocation state (e.g. sessions, errors expected) ready for next command
_ClearCommandContext();
}
return commandSucceeded;
}
internal override void ToHost(Marshaller m)
{
var id = (TpmAlgId)m.Get(typeof (TpmAlgId), "HashAlg");
if (id == TpmAlgId.Null)
{
_HashAlg = id;
HashData = new byte[0];
return;
}
_HashAlg = id;
int hashLength = CryptoLib.DigestSize(id);
HashData = m.GetArray<byte>(hashLength, "HashData");
}
