static List<IOTEventTrustResult> DeduceModifyPacketMaliciously(int selfId, HashSet<IOTPhenomemon> observedPhenomemons, double currentTime)
{
IOTGlobal global = (IOTGlobal)Global.getInstance();
//每个节点处理该类事件的次数
int[] eventCount = new int[global.readerNum];
List<IOTEventTrustResult> list = new List<IOTEventTrustResult>();
foreach (IOTPhenomemon p in observedPhenomemons)
{
double a1, a2, a3, a4, a6, a8_9;
if(p.likehood <= global.SmallValue)
continue;
if (p.type != IOTPhenomemonType.RECV_PACKET)
continue;
else if (p.pkg.Dst == p.nodeId)
continue;
else if (selfId == p.nodeId)//自己不检查自己的可信度
continue;
else if (global.readers[p.nodeId].IsGateway)
continue;
else if (currentTime - p.start < global.checkPhenomemonTimeout)
continue;
int node = p.nodeId;
eventCount[node]++;
a1 = p.likehood; //likehood of receiving a packet at time p.start
a2 = ConditionHappened(observedPhenomemons, IOTPhenomemonType.SEND_PACKET, node, p.start, p.start + global.sendPacketTimeout, p.pkg);
a3 = ConditionHappened(observedPhenomemons, IOTPhenomemonType.NOT_SEND_PACKET, node, p.start, Scheduler.getInstance().currentTime, p.pkg);
a4 = ConditionHappened(observedPhenomemons, IOTPhenomemonType.BANDWIDTH_BUSY, selfId, p.start - global.checkPhenomemonTimeout, Scheduler.getInstance().currentTime);
a6 = ConditionHappened(observedPhenomemons, IOTPhenomemonType.MOVE_FAST, node, p.start - global.checkPhenomemonTimeout, Scheduler.getInstance().currentTime);
a8_9 = ConditionHappened(observedPhenomemons, IOTPhenomemonType.SAME_PACKET_HEADER, selfId, p.start, p.start + global.sendPacketTimeout, p.pkg);
double b4 = DSClass.AND(a1, a2) * CF[(int)IOTEventType.NotModifyPacket];
double b5 = DSClass.AND(DSClass.AND(DSClass.AND(a1, a3), a8_9), a4) * CF[(int)IOTEventType.NotModifyPacketButNetworkFaulty];
double b6 = DSClass.AND(DSClass.AND(a1, a3), a8_9) * CF[(int)IOTEventType.ModifyPacketDueToNodeFaulty];
double b7 = DSClass.AND(DSClass.AND(a1, a3), a8_9) * CF[(int)IOTEventType.ModifyPacketMaliciously];
DSClass ds = new DSClass(pow(IOTModifyPacketEventType.END));
ds.SetM(pow(IOTModifyPacketEventType.NotModifyPacket), b4);
ds.SetM(pow(IOTModifyPacketEventType.NotModifyPacketButNetworkFaulty), b5);
ds.SetM(pow(IOTModifyPacketEventType.ModifyPacketDueToNodeFaulty), b6);
ds.SetM(pow(IOTModifyPacketEventType.ModifyPacketMaliciously), b7);
ds.SetM(pow(IOTModifyPacketEventType.END) - 1, 1 - b4 - b5 - b6 - b7);
ds.Cal();
//ds.Output();
//此处，我们先过滤一些正常事件，否则事件太多了
if (ds.b[pow(IOTModifyPacketEventType.NotModifyPacket)] < global.NormalBelief
&& ds.p[pow(IOTModifyPacketEventType.NotModifyPacket)] < global.NormalPlausibility)//确实是攻击,恶意事件的信念大于正常事件，或恶意事件的信念大于某一个阈值
{
string pkgIdent = p.pkg.Prev + "->" + p.pkg.Next + "[" + p.pkg.PrevSenderSeq + "]";
IOTEventTrustResult r = new IOTEventTrustResult(node, selfId, pkgIdent, IOTEventCategoryType.ModifyPacket, ds);
r.totalEventCount = eventCount[node];
r.app = p.pkg.AppId;
list.Add(r);
}
}
return list;
}
/*
//根据事件发生的频率调整该事件的可信度
static void UpdateM(IOTEventTrustCategoryResult r, IOTEventCategoryType category)
{
int count = IOTEventTrustResult.GetCountByCategory(category);
int start = IOTEventTrustResult.GetStartTypeByCategory(category);
for (int i = 0; i < count; i++)
{
int t = i + start;
IOTEventType type = (IOTEventType)t;
double confirmRate = (double)r.confirmedEventNums[i] / r.totalEventCount;
r.ds.m[DSClass.pow(i)] = r.ds.m[DSClass.pow(i)] * f(confirmRate, type);
}
}*/
//将不同节点对同一个事件的报告正交化为一个事件的报告
static IOTEventTrustResult CombineToEvent(int node, int selfId, string eventIdent, List<IOTEventTrustResult> events)
{
int len = events[0].ds.m.Length;
DSClass ds = null;
int totalCount = 0;
IOTEventCategoryType category = events[0].category;
for (int i = 0; i < events.Count; i++)
{
IOTEventTrustResult e0 = events[0];
IOTEventTrustResult e = events[i];
if (e.app != e0.app || e.node != e0.node || e.category != category)
{
Console.WriteLine("Error: app and node not match: {0}-{1}->{2}-{3}", e0.app, e0.node, e.app, e.node);
Console.ReadLine();
return null;
}
if (totalCount < e.totalEventCount)
totalCount = e.totalEventCount;
if (ds == null)
ds = e.ds;
else
ds = DSClass.Combine(ds, e.ds);//进行正交运算
}
ds.Cal();
IOTEventTrustResult r = new IOTEventTrustResult(node, selfId, node.ToString(), category, ds);
r.totalEventCount = totalCount;
r.nodeReportCount = events.Count;
return r;
}
static List<IOTEventTrustResult> DeduceModifyCommandMaliciously(int selfId, HashSet<IOTPhenomemon> observedPhenomemons, double currentTime)
{
IOTGlobal global = (IOTGlobal)Global.getInstance();
//每个节点处理该类事件的次数
int[] eventCount = new int[global.readerNum];
List<IOTEventTrustResult> list = new List<IOTEventTrustResult>();
foreach (IOTPhenomemon p in observedPhenomemons)
{
double a15_16, a17_20, a21, a6, a7, a17;
if (p.likehood <= global.SmallValue)
continue;
if (p.type != IOTPhenomemonType.RECV_PACKET)
continue;
else if (p.pkg.Dst != p.nodeId || p.pkg.Type != PacketType.COMMAND)
continue;
else if (selfId == p.nodeId)//自己不检查自己的可信度
continue;
else if (currentTime - p.start < global.checkPhenomemonTimeout)
continue;
int node = p.nodeId;
eventCount[node]++;
a15_16 = p.likehood; //likehood of receiving a packet at time p.start
a6 = ConditionHappened(observedPhenomemons, IOTPhenomemonType.MOVE_FAST, node, p.start - global.checkPhenomemonTimeout, Scheduler.getInstance().currentTime);
a7 = 0.9 - a6;
a17_20 = ConditionHappened(observedPhenomemons, IOTPhenomemonType.SEND_COMMAND,
node, p.start, p.start + global.sendPacketTimeout, p, ComparePhenomemonByExactTag);
List<IOTPhenomemon> similiarList = new List<IOTPhenomemon>();
a17 = ConditionHappened(observedPhenomemons, IOTPhenomemonType.SEND_COMMAND,
node, p.start, p.start + global.sendPacketTimeout, p, similiarList, ComparePhenomemonBySimiliarTag);
a21 = SimiliarCommand(p, similiarList);
double b17 = DSClass.AND(a15_16, a17_20) * CF[(int)IOTEventType.NotModifyCommand];
double b18 = DSClass.AND(DSClass.AND(a15_16, a17), a21) * CF[(int)IOTEventType.ModifyCommandDueToNodeFaulty];
double b19 = DSClass.AND(DSClass.AND(a15_16, a17), a21) * CF[(int)IOTEventType.ModifyCommandMaliciously];
DSClass ds = new DSClass(pow(IOTModifyCommandEventType.END));
ds.SetM(pow(IOTModifyCommandEventType.NotModifyCommand), b17);
ds.SetM(pow(IOTModifyCommandEventType.ModifyCommandDueToNodeFaulty), b18);
ds.SetM(pow(IOTModifyCommandEventType.ModifyCommandDueToNodeFaulty), b19);
ds.SetM(pow(IOTModifyCommandEventType.END) - 1, 1 - b17 - b18 - b19);
ds.Cal();
//ds.Output();
//此处，我们先过滤一些正常事件，否则事件太多了
if (ds.b[pow(IOTModifyCommandEventType.NotModifyCommand)] < global.NormalBelief
&& ds.p[pow(IOTModifyCommandEventType.NotModifyCommand)] < global.NormalPlausibility)//确实是攻击,恶意事件的信念大于正常事件，或恶意事件的信念大于某一个阈值
{
string pkgIdent = p.pkg.Prev + "->" + p.pkg.Next + "[" + p.pkg.PrevSenderSeq + "]";
IOTEventTrustResult r = new IOTEventTrustResult(node, selfId, pkgIdent, IOTEventCategoryType.ModifyCommand, ds);
r.totalEventCount = eventCount[node];
r.app = p.pkg.AppId;
list.Add(r);
}
}
return list;
}
static List<IOTEventTrustResult> DeduceMakePacketMaliciously(int selfId, HashSet<IOTPhenomemon> observedPhenomemons, double currentTime)
{
IOTGlobal global = (IOTGlobal)Global.getInstance();
//每个节点处理该类事件的次数
int[] eventCount = new int[global.readerNum];
List<IOTEventTrustResult> list = new List<IOTEventTrustResult>();
foreach(IOTPhenomemon p in observedPhenomemons)
{
double a2, a24, a23, a22_10;
if (p.likehood <= global.SmallValue)
continue;
if (p.type != IOTPhenomemonType.RECV_PACKET)
continue;
else if (p.pkg.Dst == p.nodeId)
continue;
else if (selfId == p.nodeId)//自己不检查自己的可信度
continue;
else if (global.readers[p.nodeId].IsGateway)
continue;
else if (currentTime - p.start < global.checkPhenomemonTimeout)
continue;
int node = p.nodeId;
eventCount[node]++;
a2 = p.likehood; //likehood of receiving a packet at time p.start
a24 = ConditionHappened(observedPhenomemons, IOTPhenomemonType.RECV_PACKET, selfId, p.start - global.checkPhenomemonTimeout, p.start);
a23 = Inverse(a24);
a22_10 = ConditionHappened(observedPhenomemons, IOTPhenomemonType.SAME_PACKET_DATA, selfId, p.start, p.start + global.sendPacketTimeout, p.pkg);
double b8 = DSClass.AND(a2, a24) * CF[(int)IOTEventType.NotMakePacket];
double b9 =DSClass.AND(DSClass.OR(a23, a22_10), a2) * CF[(int)IOTEventType.MakePacketMaliciously];
DSClass ds = new DSClass(pow(IOTMakePacketEventType.END));
ds.SetM(pow(IOTMakePacketEventType.NotMakePacket), b8);
ds.SetM(pow(IOTMakePacketEventType.MakePacketMaliciously), b9);
ds.SetM(pow(IOTMakePacketEventType.END) - 1, 1 - b8 - b9);
ds.Cal();
//ds.Output();
//此处，我们先过滤一些正常事件，否则事件太多了
if (ds.b[pow(IOTMakePacketEventType.NotMakePacket)] < global.NormalBelief
&& ds.p[pow(IOTMakePacketEventType.NotMakePacket)] < global.NormalPlausibility)//确实是攻击,恶意事件的信念大于正常事件，或恶意事件的信念大于某一个阈值
{
string pkgIdent = p.pkg.Prev + "->" + p.pkg.Next + "[" + p.pkg.PrevSenderSeq + "]";
IOTEventTrustResult r = new IOTEventTrustResult(node, selfId, pkgIdent, IOTEventCategoryType.MakePacket, ds);
r.totalEventCount = eventCount[node];
r.app = p.pkg.AppId;
list.Add(r);
}
}
return list;
}
static List<IOTEventTrustResult> DeduceMakeCommandMaliciously(int selfId, HashSet<IOTPhenomemon> observedPhenomemons, double currentTime)
{
IOTGlobal global = (IOTGlobal)Global.getInstance();
//每个节点处理该类事件的次数
int[] eventCount = new int[global.readerNum];
List<IOTEventTrustResult> list = new List<IOTEventTrustResult>();
foreach (IOTPhenomemon p in observedPhenomemons)
{
double a20, a24, a5, a6, a7, a17, a23, a4;
if (p.likehood <= global.SmallValue)
continue;
if (p.type != IOTPhenomemonType.SEND_COMMAND)
continue;
else if (p.pkg.Dst != p.nodeId || p.pkg.Type != PacketType.COMMAND)
continue;
else if (selfId == p.nodeId)//自己不检查自己的可信度
continue;
else if (currentTime - p.start < global.checkPhenomemonTimeout)
continue;
int node = p.nodeId;
eventCount[node]++;
a17 = p.likehood; //likehood of receiving a packet at time p.start
a6 = ConditionHappened(observedPhenomemons, IOTPhenomemonType.MOVE_FAST, node, p.start - global.checkPhenomemonTimeout, Scheduler.getInstance().currentTime);
//如果对带宽占用没有知识，则正反都设置为未知。
a4 = ConditionHappened(observedPhenomemons, IOTPhenomemonType.BANDWIDTH_BUSY, selfId, p.start - global.checkPhenomemonTimeout, Scheduler.getInstance().currentTime);
a5 = 0.9 - a4;
a7 = 0.9 - a6;
List<IOTPhenomemon> similiarList = new List<IOTPhenomemon>();
a24 = ConditionHappened(observedPhenomemons, IOTPhenomemonType.SEND_COMMAND,
node, p.start - global.sendPacketTimeout, p.start, p, similiarList, ComparePhenomemonBySimiliarTag);
a20 = SimiliarCommand(p, similiarList);
if (Utility.DoubleEqual(a20, global.SmallValue) || Utility.DoubleEqual(a24, global.SmallValue))
a23 = 0.9 - global.SmallValue;
else
a23 = Math.Max(a20, a24);
double b20 = DSClass.AND(DSClass.AND(a17, a20), a24) * CF[(int)IOTEventType.NotMakeCommand];
double b21 = DSClass.AND(DSClass.AND(DSClass.AND(17, a20), a23), a6) * CF[(int)IOTEventType.NotMakeCommandButMove];
double b22 = DSClass.AND(DSClass.AND(DSClass.AND(17, a20), a23), a4) * CF[(int)IOTEventType.NotMakeCommandButNetworkDelay];
double b23 = DSClass.AND(DSClass.AND(DSClass.AND(DSClass.AND(17, a20), a23), a5), a7) * CF[(int)IOTEventType.MakeCommandMaliciously];
DSClass ds = new DSClass(pow(IOTMakeCommandEventType.END));
ds.SetM(pow(IOTMakeCommandEventType.NotMakeCommand), b20);
ds.SetM(pow(IOTMakeCommandEventType.NotMakeCommandButNetworkDelay), b21);
ds.SetM(pow(IOTMakeCommandEventType.NotMakeCommandButNetworkDelay), b22);
ds.SetM(pow(IOTMakeCommandEventType.MakeCommandMaliciously), b23);
ds.SetM(pow(IOTMakeCommandEventType.END) - 1, 1 - b21 - b22 - b23);
ds.Cal();
//ds.Output();
//此处，我们先过滤一些正常事件，否则事件太多了
if (ds.b[pow(IOTMakeCommandEventType.NotMakeCommand)] < global.NormalBelief
&& ds.p[pow(IOTMakeCommandEventType.NotMakeCommand)] < global.NormalPlausibility)//确实是攻击,恶意事件的信念大于正常事件，或恶意事件的信念大于某一个阈值
{
string pkgIdent = p.pkg.Prev + "->" + p.pkg.Next + "[" + p.pkg.PrevSenderSeq + "]";
IOTEventTrustResult r = new IOTEventTrustResult(node, selfId, pkgIdent, IOTEventCategoryType.MakeCommand, ds);
r.totalEventCount = eventCount[node];
r.app = p.pkg.AppId;
list.Add(r);
}
}
return list;
}
static List<IOTEventTrustResult> DeduceDropPacketMaliciously(int selfId, HashSet<IOTPhenomemon> observedPhenomemons, double currentTime)
{
IOTGlobal global = (IOTGlobal)Global.getInstance();
//每个节点处理该类事件的次数
int[] eventCount = new int[global.readerNum];
List<IOTEventTrustResult> list = new List<IOTEventTrustResult>();
foreach (IOTPhenomemon p in observedPhenomemons)
{
double a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a19, a27;
if (p.likehood <= global.SmallValue)
continue;
if (p.type != IOTPhenomemonType.RECV_PACKET)
continue;
else if (p.pkg.Dst == p.nodeId)
continue;
else if (selfId == p.nodeId)//自己不检查自己的可信度
continue;
else if (global.readers[p.nodeId].IsGateway)
continue;
else if (currentTime - p.start < global.checkPhenomemonTimeout)
continue;
int node = p.nodeId;
eventCount[node]++;
a1 = p.likehood; //likehood of receiving a packet at time p.start
a2 = ConditionHappened(observedPhenomemons, IOTPhenomemonType.SEND_PACKET, node, p.start, p.start + global.sendPacketTimeout, p.pkg);
a3 = ConditionHappened(observedPhenomemons, IOTPhenomemonType.NOT_SEND_PACKET, node, p.start, Scheduler.getInstance().currentTime, p.pkg);
a4 = ConditionHappened(observedPhenomemons, IOTPhenomemonType.BANDWIDTH_BUSY, selfId, p.start - global.checkPhenomemonTimeout, Scheduler.getInstance().currentTime);
//如果对带宽占用没有知识，则正反都设置为未知。
a5 = 0.9 - a4;
a6 = Utility.Max(new double[]{
ConditionHappened(observedPhenomemons, IOTPhenomemonType.MOVE_FAST, node, p.start - global.checkPhenomemonTimeout, Scheduler.getInstance().currentTime),
ConditionHappened(observedPhenomemons, IOTPhenomemonType.MOVE_FAST, p.pkg.Prev, p.start - global.checkPhenomemonTimeout, Scheduler.getInstance().currentTime),
ConditionHappened(observedPhenomemons, IOTPhenomemonType.MOVE_FAST, selfId, p.start - global.checkPhenomemonTimeout, Scheduler.getInstance().currentTime)
});
a7 = 0.9 - a6;
a19 = Math.Max(FarDistanceLikehood(selfId, node, p.pkg.DstType==NodeType.OBJECT),
FarDistanceLikehood(selfId, p.pkg.Prev, false));
a27 = 0.9 - a19;
//A1 AND A2 AND A7 AND A11 -> B1
double b0 = DSClass.AND(a1, a2) * CF[(int)IOTEventType.NotDropPacket];
//A1 AND A2 AND A7 AND A11 -> B1
double b1 = DSClass.AND(DSClass.AND(a1, a3), DSClass.OR(DSClass.OR(a4, a6), a19)) * CF[(int)IOTEventType.NotDropPacketButNotReceivePacket];
//A1 AND A2 AND A7 AND A11 -> B1
double b2 = DSClass.AND(DSClass.AND(a1, a3), a4) * CF[(int)IOTEventType.DropPacketDueToBandwith];
//A1 AND A2 AND A7 AND A11 -> B1
double b3 = DSClass.AND(DSClass.AND(DSClass.AND(DSClass.AND(a1, a3), a5), a7), a27) * CF[(int)IOTEventType.DropPacketMaliciously];
DSClass ds = new DSClass(pow(IOTDropPacketEventType.END));
ds.SetM(pow(IOTDropPacketEventType.NotDropPacket), b0);
ds.SetM(pow(IOTDropPacketEventType.NotDropPacketButNotReceivePacket), b1);
ds.SetM(pow(IOTDropPacketEventType.DropPacketDueToBandwith), b2);
ds.SetM(pow(IOTDropPacketEventType.DropPacketMaliciously), b3);
ds.SetM(pow(IOTDropPacketEventType.END) - 1, 1 - b0 - b1 - b2 - b3);
ds.Cal();
//ds.Output();
//此处，我们先过滤一些正常事件，否则事件太多了
if (ds.b[pow(IOTEventType.NotDropPacket) + pow(IOTEventType.NotDropPacketButNotReceivePacket)] < global.NormalBelief
&& ds.p[pow(IOTEventType.NotDropPacket) + pow(IOTEventType.NotDropPacketButNotReceivePacket)] < global.NormalPlausibility)//确实是攻击,恶意事件的信念大于正常事件，或恶意事件的信念大于某一个阈值
{
string pkgIdent = p.pkg.Prev + "->" + p.pkg.Next + "[" + p.pkg.PrevSenderSeq + "]";
IOTEventTrustResult r = new IOTEventTrustResult(node, selfId, pkgIdent, IOTEventCategoryType.DropPacket, ds);
r.totalEventCount = eventCount[node];
r.app = p.pkg.AppId;
list.Add(r);
Console.WriteLine("{0:F4} reader{1} think reader{2} is not normal.", currentTime, selfId, p.nodeId);
//r.ds.Output();
}
}
return list;
}
static List<IOTEventTrustResult> DeduceDropCommandMaliciously(int selfId, HashSet<IOTPhenomemon> observedPhenomemons, double currentTime)
{
IOTGlobal global = (IOTGlobal)Global.getInstance();
//每个节点处理该类事件的次数
int[] eventCount = new int[global.readerNum];
List<IOTEventTrustResult> list = new List<IOTEventTrustResult>();
foreach (IOTPhenomemon p in observedPhenomemons)
{
double a15_16, a17_20, a18_20, a19, a6, a7;
if (p.likehood <= global.SmallValue)
continue;
if (p.type != IOTPhenomemonType.RECV_PACKET)
continue;
else if (p.pkg.Dst != p.nodeId ||p.pkg.Type != PacketType.COMMAND)
continue;
else if (selfId == p.nodeId)//自己不检查自己的可信度
continue;
else if (currentTime - p.start < global.checkPhenomemonTimeout)
continue;
int node = p.nodeId;
eventCount[node]++;
a15_16 = p.likehood; //likehood of receiving a packet at time p.start
a6 = ConditionHappened(observedPhenomemons, IOTPhenomemonType.MOVE_FAST, node, p.start - global.checkPhenomemonTimeout, Scheduler.getInstance().currentTime);
a7 = 0.9 - a6;
a17_20 = ConditionHappened(observedPhenomemons, IOTPhenomemonType.SEND_COMMAND, node, p.start, p.start + global.sendPacketTimeout, p, ComparePhenomemonByExactTag);
a18_20 = ConditionHappened(observedPhenomemons, IOTPhenomemonType.NOT_SEND_COMMAND, node, p.start, Scheduler.getInstance().currentTime, p.pkg);
//第三个参数是“数据包的目的地是否是标签”，由于命令的目的肯定是标签，所以永远为true
a19 = FarDistanceLikehood(selfId, node, true);
double b14 = DSClass.AND(a15_16, a17_20) * CF[(int)IOTEventType.NotDropCommand];
double b15 = DSClass.AND(DSClass.AND(a15_16, a18_20), DSClass.OR(a6, a19)) * CF[(int)IOTEventType.NotDropCommandButNotDetected];
double b16 = DSClass.AND(DSClass.AND(a15_16, a18_20), a7) * CF[(int)IOTEventType.DropCommandMaliciously];
DSClass ds = new DSClass(pow(IOTDropCommandEventType.END));
ds.SetM(pow(IOTDropCommandEventType.NotDropCommand), b14);
ds.SetM(pow(IOTDropCommandEventType.NotDropCommandButNotDetected), b15);
ds.SetM(pow(IOTDropCommandEventType.DropCommandMaliciously), b16);
ds.SetM(pow(IOTDropCommandEventType.END) - 1, 1 - b14 - b15 - b16);
ds.Cal();
//ds.Output();
//此处，我们先过滤一些正常事件，否则事件太多了
if (ds.b[pow(IOTDropCommandEventType.NotDropCommand)] < global.NormalBelief
&& ds.p[pow(IOTDropCommandEventType.NotDropCommand)] < global.NormalPlausibility)//确实是攻击,恶意事件的信念大于正常事件，或恶意事件的信念大于某一个阈值
{
string pkgIdent = p.pkg.Prev + "->" + p.pkg.Next + "[" + p.pkg.PrevSenderSeq + "]";
IOTEventTrustResult r = new IOTEventTrustResult(node, selfId, pkgIdent, IOTEventCategoryType.DropCommand, ds);
r.totalEventCount = eventCount[node];
r.app = p.pkg.AppId;
list.Add(r);
}
}
return list;
}
