protected virtual byte[] ProcessHelloVerifyRequest(ClientHandshakeState state, byte[] body)
{
MemoryStream buf = new MemoryStream(body, false);
ProtocolVersion server_version = TlsUtilities.ReadVersion(buf);
byte[] cookie = TlsUtilities.ReadOpaque8(buf);
TlsProtocol.AssertEmpty(buf);
// TODO Seems this behaviour is not yet in line with OpenSSL for DTLS 1.2
// reportServerVersion(state, server_version);
if (!server_version.IsEqualOrEarlierVersionOf(state.clientContext.ClientVersion))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
/*
* RFC 6347 This specification increases the cookie size limit to 255 bytes for greater
* future flexibility. The limit remains 32 for previous versions of DTLS.
*/
if (!ProtocolVersion.DTLSv12.IsEqualOrEarlierVersionOf(server_version) && cookie.Length > 32)
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
return(cookie);
}
public virtual ProtocolVersion GetServerVersion()
{
if (MinimumVersion.IsEqualOrEarlierVersionOf(mClientVersion))
{
ProtocolVersion maximumVersion = MaximumVersion;
if (mClientVersion.IsEqualOrEarlierVersionOf(maximumVersion))
{
return(mServerVersion = mClientVersion);
}
if (mClientVersion.IsLaterVersionOf(maximumVersion))
{
return(mServerVersion = maximumVersion);
}
}
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.protocol_version);
}
public static byte[] SafeDecryptPreMasterSecret(TlsContext context, RsaKeyParameters rsaServerPrivateKey,
byte[] encryptedPreMasterSecret)
{
/*
* RFC 5246 7.4.7.1.
*/
ProtocolVersion clientVersion = context.ClientVersion;
// TODO Provide as configuration option?
bool versionNumberCheckDisabled = false;
/*
* Generate 48 random bytes we can use as a Pre-Master-Secret, if the
* PKCS1 padding check should fail.
*/
byte[] fallback = new byte[48];
context.SecureRandom.NextBytes(fallback);
byte[] M = Arrays.Clone(fallback);
try
{
Pkcs1Encoding encoding = new Pkcs1Encoding(new RsaBlindedEngine(), fallback);
encoding.Init(false,
new ParametersWithRandom(rsaServerPrivateKey, context.SecureRandom));
M = encoding.ProcessBlock(encryptedPreMasterSecret, 0, encryptedPreMasterSecret.Length);
}
catch (Exception)
{
/*
* This should never happen since the decryption should never throw an exception
* and return a random value instead.
*
* In any case, a TLS server MUST NOT generate an alert if processing an
* RSA-encrypted premaster secret message fails, or the version number is not as
* expected. Instead, it MUST continue the handshake with a randomly generated
* premaster secret.
*/
}
/*
* If ClientHello.client_version is TLS 1.1 or higher, server implementations MUST
* check the version number [..].
*/
if (versionNumberCheckDisabled && clientVersion.IsEqualOrEarlierVersionOf(ProtocolVersion.TLSv10))
{
/*
* If the version number is TLS 1.0 or earlier, server
* implementations SHOULD check the version number, but MAY have a
* configuration option to disable the check.
*
* So there is nothing to do here.
*/
}
else
{
/*
* OK, we need to compare the version number in the decrypted Pre-Master-Secret with the
* clientVersion received during the handshake. If they don't match, we replace the
* decrypted Pre-Master-Secret with a random one.
*/
int correct = (clientVersion.MajorVersion ^ (M[0] & 0xff))
| (clientVersion.MinorVersion ^ (M[1] & 0xff));
correct |= correct >> 1;
correct |= correct >> 2;
correct |= correct >> 4;
int mask = ~((correct & 1) - 1);
/*
* mask will be all bits set to 0xff if the version number differed.
*/
for (int i = 0; i < 48; i++)
{
M[i] = (byte)((M[i] & (~mask)) | (fallback[i] & mask));
}
}
return(M);
}
protected virtual void SendServerHelloMessage()
{
HandshakeMessage message = new HandshakeMessage(HandshakeType.server_hello);
{
ProtocolVersion server_version = mTlsServer.GetServerVersion();
if (!server_version.IsEqualOrEarlierVersionOf(Context.ClientVersion))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
}
mRecordStream.ReadVersion = server_version;
mRecordStream.SetWriteVersion(server_version);
mRecordStream.SetRestrictReadVersion(true);
ContextAdmin.SetServerVersion(server_version);
TlsUtilities.WriteVersion(server_version, message);
}
message.Write(this.mSecurityParameters.serverRandom);
/*
* The server may return an empty session_id to indicate that the session will not be cached
* and therefore cannot be resumed.
*/
TlsUtilities.WriteOpaque8(TlsUtilities.EmptyBytes, message);
int selectedCipherSuite = mTlsServer.GetSelectedCipherSuite();
if (!Arrays.Contains(mOfferedCipherSuites, selectedCipherSuite) ||
selectedCipherSuite == CipherSuite.TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL ||
CipherSuite.IsScsv(selectedCipherSuite) ||
!TlsUtilities.IsValidCipherSuiteForVersion(selectedCipherSuite, Context.ServerVersion))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
}
mSecurityParameters.cipherSuite = selectedCipherSuite;
byte selectedCompressionMethod = mTlsServer.GetSelectedCompressionMethod();
if (!Arrays.Contains(mOfferedCompressionMethods, selectedCompressionMethod))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
}
mSecurityParameters.compressionAlgorithm = selectedCompressionMethod;
TlsUtilities.WriteUint16(selectedCipherSuite, message);
TlsUtilities.WriteUint8(selectedCompressionMethod, message);
this.mServerExtensions = mTlsServer.GetServerExtensions();
/*
* RFC 5746 3.6. Server Behavior: Initial Handshake
*/
if (this.mSecureRenegotiation)
{
byte[] renegExtData = TlsUtilities.GetExtensionData(this.mServerExtensions, ExtensionType.renegotiation_info);
bool noRenegExt = (null == renegExtData);
if (noRenegExt)
{
/*
* Note that Sending a "renegotiation_info" extension in response to a ClientHello
* containing only the SCSV is an explicit exception to the prohibition in RFC 5246,
* Section 7.4.1.4, on the server Sending unsolicited extensions and is only allowed
* because the client is signaling its willingness to receive the extension via the
* TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV SCSV.
*/
/*
* If the secure_renegotiation flag is set to TRUE, the server MUST include an empty
* "renegotiation_info" extension in the ServerHello message.
*/
this.mServerExtensions = TlsExtensionsUtilities.EnsureExtensionsInitialised(mServerExtensions);
this.mServerExtensions[ExtensionType.renegotiation_info] = CreateRenegotiationInfo(TlsUtilities.EmptyBytes);
}
}
if (mSecurityParameters.extendedMasterSecret)
{
this.mServerExtensions = TlsExtensionsUtilities.EnsureExtensionsInitialised(mServerExtensions);
TlsExtensionsUtilities.AddExtendedMasterSecretExtension(mServerExtensions);
}
/*
* TODO RFC 3546 2.3 If [...] the older session is resumed, then the server MUST ignore
* extensions appearing in the client hello, and Send a server hello containing no
* extensions.
*/
if (this.mServerExtensions != null)
{
this.mSecurityParameters.encryptThenMac = TlsExtensionsUtilities.HasEncryptThenMacExtension(mServerExtensions);
this.mSecurityParameters.maxFragmentLength = ProcessMaxFragmentLengthExtension(mClientExtensions,
mServerExtensions, AlertDescription.internal_error);
this.mSecurityParameters.truncatedHMac = TlsExtensionsUtilities.HasTruncatedHMacExtension(mServerExtensions);
/*
* TODO It's surprising that there's no provision to allow a 'fresh' CertificateStatus to be sent in
* a session resumption handshake.
*/
this.mAllowCertificateStatus = !mResumedSession &&
TlsUtilities.HasExpectedEmptyExtensionData(mServerExtensions, ExtensionType.status_request,
AlertDescription.internal_error);
this.mExpectSessionTicket = !mResumedSession &&
TlsUtilities.HasExpectedEmptyExtensionData(mServerExtensions, ExtensionType.session_ticket,
AlertDescription.internal_error);
WriteExtensions(message, this.mServerExtensions);
}
mSecurityParameters.prfAlgorithm = GetPrfAlgorithm(Context, mSecurityParameters.CipherSuite);
/*
* RFC 5264 7.4.9. Any cipher suite which does not explicitly specify verify_data_length has
* a verify_data_length equal to 12. This includes all existing cipher suites.
*/
mSecurityParameters.verifyDataLength = 12;
ApplyMaxFragmentLengthExtension();
message.WriteToRecordStream(this);
}
protected virtual byte[] GenerateServerHello(ServerHandshakeState state)
{
SecurityParameters securityParameters = state.serverContext.SecurityParameters;
MemoryStream buf = new MemoryStream();
{
ProtocolVersion server_version = state.server.GetServerVersion();
if (!server_version.IsEqualOrEarlierVersionOf(state.serverContext.ClientVersion))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
}
// TODO Read RFCs for guidance on the expected record layer version number
// recordStream.setReadVersion(server_version);
// recordStream.setWriteVersion(server_version);
// recordStream.setRestrictReadVersion(true);
state.serverContext.SetServerVersion(server_version);
TlsUtilities.WriteVersion(state.serverContext.ServerVersion, buf);
}
buf.Write(securityParameters.ServerRandom, 0, securityParameters.ServerRandom.Length);
/*
* The server may return an empty session_id to indicate that the session will not be cached
* and therefore cannot be resumed.
*/
TlsUtilities.WriteOpaque8(TlsUtilities.EmptyBytes, buf);
int selectedCipherSuite = state.server.GetSelectedCipherSuite();
if (!Arrays.Contains(state.offeredCipherSuites, selectedCipherSuite) ||
selectedCipherSuite == CipherSuite.TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL ||
CipherSuite.IsScsv(selectedCipherSuite) ||
!TlsUtilities.IsValidCipherSuiteForVersion(selectedCipherSuite, state.serverContext.ServerVersion))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
}
ValidateSelectedCipherSuite(selectedCipherSuite, AlertDescription.internal_error);
securityParameters.cipherSuite = selectedCipherSuite;
byte selectedCompressionMethod = state.server.GetSelectedCompressionMethod();
if (!Arrays.Contains(state.offeredCompressionMethods, selectedCompressionMethod))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
}
securityParameters.compressionAlgorithm = selectedCompressionMethod;
TlsUtilities.WriteUint16(selectedCipherSuite, buf);
TlsUtilities.WriteUint8(selectedCompressionMethod, buf);
state.serverExtensions = state.server.GetServerExtensions();
/*
* RFC 5746 3.6. Server Behavior: Initial Handshake
*/
if (state.secure_renegotiation)
{
byte[] renegExtData = TlsUtilities.GetExtensionData(state.serverExtensions, ExtensionType.renegotiation_info);
bool noRenegExt = (null == renegExtData);
if (noRenegExt)
{
/*
* Note that sending a "renegotiation_info" extension in response to a ClientHello
* containing only the SCSV is an explicit exception to the prohibition in RFC 5246,
* Section 7.4.1.4, on the server sending unsolicited extensions and is only allowed
* because the client is signaling its willingness to receive the extension via the
* TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV SCSV.
*/
/*
* If the secure_renegotiation flag is set to TRUE, the server MUST include an empty
* "renegotiation_info" extension in the ServerHello message.
*/
state.serverExtensions = TlsExtensionsUtilities.EnsureExtensionsInitialised(state.serverExtensions);
state.serverExtensions[ExtensionType.renegotiation_info] = TlsProtocol.CreateRenegotiationInfo(TlsUtilities.EmptyBytes);
}
}
if (securityParameters.extendedMasterSecret)
{
state.serverExtensions = TlsExtensionsUtilities.EnsureExtensionsInitialised(state.serverExtensions);
TlsExtensionsUtilities.AddExtendedMasterSecretExtension(state.serverExtensions);
}
/*
* TODO RFC 3546 2.3 If [...] the older session is resumed, then the server MUST ignore
* extensions appearing in the client hello, and send a server hello containing no
* extensions.
*/
if (state.serverExtensions != null)
{
securityParameters.encryptThenMac = TlsExtensionsUtilities.HasEncryptThenMacExtension(state.serverExtensions);
securityParameters.maxFragmentLength = EvaluateMaxFragmentLengthExtension(state.resumedSession,
state.clientExtensions, state.serverExtensions, AlertDescription.internal_error);
securityParameters.truncatedHMac = TlsExtensionsUtilities.HasTruncatedHMacExtension(state.serverExtensions);
/*
* TODO It's surprising that there's no provision to allow a 'fresh' CertificateStatus to be sent in
* a session resumption handshake.
*/
state.allowCertificateStatus = !state.resumedSession &&
TlsUtilities.HasExpectedEmptyExtensionData(state.serverExtensions, ExtensionType.status_request,
AlertDescription.internal_error);
state.expectSessionTicket = !state.resumedSession &&
TlsUtilities.HasExpectedEmptyExtensionData(state.serverExtensions, ExtensionType.session_ticket,
AlertDescription.internal_error);
TlsProtocol.WriteExtensions(buf, state.serverExtensions);
}
securityParameters.prfAlgorithm = TlsProtocol.GetPrfAlgorithm(state.serverContext,
securityParameters.CipherSuite);
/*
* RFC 5264 7.4.9. Any cipher suite which does not explicitly specify verify_data_length
* has a verify_data_length equal to 12. This includes all existing cipher suites.
*/
securityParameters.verifyDataLength = 12;
return(buf.ToArray());
}
protected virtual void ReceiveServerHelloMessage(MemoryStream buf)
{
{
ProtocolVersion server_version = TlsUtilities.ReadVersion(buf);
if (server_version.IsDtls)
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
// Check that this matches what the server is Sending in the record layer
if (!server_version.Equals(this.mRecordStream.ReadVersion))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
ProtocolVersion client_version = Context.ClientVersion;
if (!server_version.IsEqualOrEarlierVersionOf(client_version))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
this.mRecordStream.SetWriteVersion(server_version);
ContextAdmin.SetServerVersion(server_version);
this.mTlsClient.NotifyServerVersion(server_version);
}
/*
* Read the server random
*/
this.mSecurityParameters.serverRandom = TlsUtilities.ReadFully(32, buf);
this.mSelectedSessionID = TlsUtilities.ReadOpaque8(buf);
if (this.mSelectedSessionID.Length > 32)
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
this.mTlsClient.NotifySessionID(this.mSelectedSessionID);
this.mResumedSession = this.mSelectedSessionID.Length > 0 && this.mTlsSession != null &&
Arrays.AreEqual(this.mSelectedSessionID, this.mTlsSession.SessionID);
/*
* Find out which CipherSuite the server has chosen and check that it was one of the offered
* ones, and is a valid selection for the negotiated version.
*/
int selectedCipherSuite = TlsUtilities.ReadUint16(buf);
if (!Arrays.Contains(this.mOfferedCipherSuites, selectedCipherSuite) ||
selectedCipherSuite == CipherSuite.TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL ||
CipherSuite.IsScsv(selectedCipherSuite) ||
!TlsUtilities.IsValidCipherSuiteForVersion(selectedCipherSuite, Context.ServerVersion))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
this.mTlsClient.NotifySelectedCipherSuite(selectedCipherSuite);
/*
* Find out which CompressionMethod the server has chosen and check that it was one of the
* offered ones.
*/
byte selectedCompressionMethod = TlsUtilities.ReadUint8(buf);
if (!Arrays.Contains(this.mOfferedCompressionMethods, selectedCompressionMethod))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
this.mTlsClient.NotifySelectedCompressionMethod(selectedCompressionMethod);
/*
* RFC3546 2.2 The extended server hello message format MAY be sent in place of the server
* hello message when the client has requested extended functionality via the extended
* client hello message specified in Section 2.1. ... Note that the extended server hello
* message is only sent in response to an extended client hello message. This prevents the
* possibility that the extended server hello message could "break" existing TLS 1.0
* clients.
*/
this.mServerExtensions = ReadExtensions(buf);
/*
* RFC 3546 2.2 Note that the extended server hello message is only sent in response to an
* extended client hello message.
*
* However, see RFC 5746 exception below. We always include the SCSV, so an Extended Server
* Hello is always allowed.
*/
if (this.mServerExtensions != null)
{
foreach (int extType in this.mServerExtensions.Keys)
{
/*
* RFC 5746 3.6. Note that Sending a "renegotiation_info" extension in response to a
* ClientHello containing only the SCSV is an explicit exception to the prohibition
* in RFC 5246, Section 7.4.1.4, on the server Sending unsolicited extensions and is
* only allowed because the client is signaling its willingness to receive the
* extension via the TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV SCSV.
*/
if (extType == ExtensionType.renegotiation_info)
{
continue;
}
/*
* RFC 5246 7.4.1.4 An extension type MUST NOT appear in the ServerHello unless the
* same extension type appeared in the corresponding ClientHello. If a client
* receives an extension type in ServerHello that it did not request in the
* associated ClientHello, it MUST abort the handshake with an unsupported_extension
* fatal alert.
*/
if (null == TlsUtilities.GetExtensionData(this.mClientExtensions, extType))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unsupported_extension);
}
/*
* RFC 3546 2.3. If [...] the older session is resumed, then the server MUST ignore
* extensions appearing in the client hello, and Send a server hello containing no
* extensions[.]
*/
if (this.mResumedSession)
{
// TODO[compat-gnutls] GnuTLS test server Sends server extensions e.g. ec_point_formats
// TODO[compat-openssl] OpenSSL test server Sends server extensions e.g. ec_point_formats
// TODO[compat-polarssl] PolarSSL test server Sends server extensions e.g. ec_point_formats
// throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
}
}
/*
* RFC 5746 3.4. Client Behavior: Initial Handshake
*/
{
/*
* When a ServerHello is received, the client MUST check if it includes the
* "renegotiation_info" extension:
*/
byte[] renegExtData = TlsUtilities.GetExtensionData(this.mServerExtensions, ExtensionType.renegotiation_info);
if (renegExtData != null)
{
/*
* If the extension is present, set the secure_renegotiation flag to TRUE. The
* client MUST then verify that the length of the "renegotiated_connection"
* field is zero, and if it is not, MUST abort the handshake (by Sending a fatal
* handshake_failure alert).
*/
this.mSecureRenegotiation = true;
if (!Arrays.ConstantTimeAreEqual(renegExtData, CreateRenegotiationInfo(TlsUtilities.EmptyBytes)))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.handshake_failure);
}
}
}
// TODO[compat-gnutls] GnuTLS test server fails to Send renegotiation_info extension when resuming
this.mTlsClient.NotifySecureRenegotiation(this.mSecureRenegotiation);
IDictionary sessionClientExtensions = mClientExtensions, sessionServerExtensions = mServerExtensions;
if (this.mResumedSession)
{
if (selectedCipherSuite != this.mSessionParameters.CipherSuite ||
selectedCompressionMethod != this.mSessionParameters.CompressionAlgorithm)
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
sessionClientExtensions = null;
sessionServerExtensions = this.mSessionParameters.ReadServerExtensions();
}
this.mSecurityParameters.cipherSuite = selectedCipherSuite;
this.mSecurityParameters.compressionAlgorithm = selectedCompressionMethod;
if (sessionServerExtensions != null)
{
{
/*
* RFC 7366 3. If a server receives an encrypt-then-MAC request extension from a client
* and then selects a stream or Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)
* ciphersuite, it MUST NOT send an encrypt-then-MAC response extension back to the
* client.
*/
bool serverSentEncryptThenMAC = TlsExtensionsUtilities.HasEncryptThenMacExtension(sessionServerExtensions);
if (serverSentEncryptThenMAC && !TlsUtilities.IsBlockCipherSuite(selectedCipherSuite))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
this.mSecurityParameters.encryptThenMac = serverSentEncryptThenMAC;
}
this.mSecurityParameters.extendedMasterSecret = TlsExtensionsUtilities.HasExtendedMasterSecretExtension(sessionServerExtensions);
this.mSecurityParameters.maxFragmentLength = ProcessMaxFragmentLengthExtension(sessionClientExtensions,
sessionServerExtensions, AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
this.mSecurityParameters.truncatedHMac = TlsExtensionsUtilities.HasTruncatedHMacExtension(sessionServerExtensions);
/*
* TODO It's surprising that there's no provision to allow a 'fresh' CertificateStatus to be sent in
* a session resumption handshake.
*/
this.mAllowCertificateStatus = !this.mResumedSession &&
TlsUtilities.HasExpectedEmptyExtensionData(sessionServerExtensions, ExtensionType.status_request,
AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
this.mExpectSessionTicket = !this.mResumedSession &&
TlsUtilities.HasExpectedEmptyExtensionData(sessionServerExtensions, ExtensionType.session_ticket,
AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
/*
* TODO[session-hash]
*
* draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-04 4. Clients and servers SHOULD NOT accept handshakes
* that do not use the extended master secret [..]. (and see 5.2, 5.3)
*/
if (sessionClientExtensions != null)
{
this.mTlsClient.ProcessServerExtensions(sessionServerExtensions);
}
this.mSecurityParameters.prfAlgorithm = GetPrfAlgorithm(Context, this.mSecurityParameters.CipherSuite);
/*
* RFC 5264 7.4.9. Any cipher suite which does not explicitly specify
* verify_data_length has a verify_data_length equal to 12. This includes all
* existing cipher suites.
*/
this.mSecurityParameters.verifyDataLength = 12;
}
internal virtual DtlsTransport ClientHandshake(ClientHandshakeState state, DtlsRecordLayer recordLayer)
{
SecurityParameters securityParameters = state.clientContext.SecurityParameters;
DtlsReliableHandshake handshake = new DtlsReliableHandshake(state.clientContext, recordLayer);
byte[] clientHelloBody = GenerateClientHello(state, state.client);
recordLayer.SetWriteVersion(ProtocolVersion.DTLSv10);
handshake.SendMessage(HandshakeType.client_hello, clientHelloBody);
DtlsReliableHandshake.Message serverMessage = handshake.ReceiveMessage();
while (serverMessage.Type == HandshakeType.hello_verify_request)
{
ProtocolVersion recordLayerVersion = recordLayer.ReadVersion;
ProtocolVersion client_version = state.clientContext.ClientVersion;
/*
* RFC 6347 4.2.1 DTLS 1.2 server implementations SHOULD use DTLS version 1.0 regardless of
* the version of TLS that is expected to be negotiated. DTLS 1.2 and 1.0 clients MUST use
* the version solely to indicate packet formatting (which is the same in both DTLS 1.2 and
* 1.0) and not as part of version negotiation.
*/
if (!recordLayerVersion.IsEqualOrEarlierVersionOf(client_version))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
recordLayer.ReadVersion = null;
byte[] cookie = ProcessHelloVerifyRequest(state, serverMessage.Body);
byte[] patched = PatchClientHelloWithCookie(clientHelloBody, cookie);
handshake.ResetHandshakeMessagesDigest();
handshake.SendMessage(HandshakeType.client_hello, patched);
serverMessage = handshake.ReceiveMessage();
}
if (serverMessage.Type == HandshakeType.server_hello)
{
ProtocolVersion recordLayerVersion = recordLayer.ReadVersion;
ReportServerVersion(state, recordLayerVersion);
recordLayer.SetWriteVersion(recordLayerVersion);
ProcessServerHello(state, serverMessage.Body);
}
else
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
handshake.NotifyHelloComplete();
ApplyMaxFragmentLengthExtension(recordLayer, securityParameters.maxFragmentLength);
if (state.resumedSession)
{
securityParameters.masterSecret = Arrays.Clone(state.sessionParameters.MasterSecret);
recordLayer.InitPendingEpoch(state.client.GetCipher());
// NOTE: Calculated exclusive of the actual Finished message from the server
byte[] resExpectedServerVerifyData = TlsUtilities.CalculateVerifyData(state.clientContext, ExporterLabel.server_finished,
TlsProtocol.GetCurrentPrfHash(state.clientContext, handshake.HandshakeHash, null));
ProcessFinished(handshake.ReceiveMessageBody(HandshakeType.finished), resExpectedServerVerifyData);
// NOTE: Calculated exclusive of the Finished message itself
byte[] resClientVerifyData = TlsUtilities.CalculateVerifyData(state.clientContext, ExporterLabel.client_finished,
TlsProtocol.GetCurrentPrfHash(state.clientContext, handshake.HandshakeHash, null));
handshake.SendMessage(HandshakeType.finished, resClientVerifyData);
handshake.Finish();
state.clientContext.SetResumableSession(state.tlsSession);
state.client.NotifyHandshakeComplete();
return(new DtlsTransport(recordLayer));
}
InvalidateSession(state);
if (state.selectedSessionID.Length > 0)
{
state.tlsSession = new TlsSessionImpl(state.selectedSessionID, null);
}
serverMessage = handshake.ReceiveMessage();
if (serverMessage.Type == HandshakeType.supplemental_data)
{
ProcessServerSupplementalData(state, serverMessage.Body);
serverMessage = handshake.ReceiveMessage();
}
else
{
state.client.ProcessServerSupplementalData(null);
}
state.keyExchange = state.client.GetKeyExchange();
state.keyExchange.Init(state.clientContext);
Certificate serverCertificate = null;
if (serverMessage.Type == HandshakeType.certificate)
{
serverCertificate = ProcessServerCertificate(state, serverMessage.Body);
serverMessage = handshake.ReceiveMessage();
}
else
{
// Okay, Certificate is optional
state.keyExchange.SkipServerCredentials();
}
// TODO[RFC 3546] Check whether empty certificates is possible, allowed, or excludes CertificateStatus
if (serverCertificate == null || serverCertificate.IsEmpty)
{
state.allowCertificateStatus = false;
}
if (serverMessage.Type == HandshakeType.certificate_status)
{
ProcessCertificateStatus(state, serverMessage.Body);
serverMessage = handshake.ReceiveMessage();
}
else
{
// Okay, CertificateStatus is optional
}
if (serverMessage.Type == HandshakeType.server_key_exchange)
{
ProcessServerKeyExchange(state, serverMessage.Body);
serverMessage = handshake.ReceiveMessage();
}
else
{
// Okay, ServerKeyExchange is optional
state.keyExchange.SkipServerKeyExchange();
}
if (serverMessage.Type == HandshakeType.certificate_request)
{
ProcessCertificateRequest(state, serverMessage.Body);
/*
* TODO Give the client a chance to immediately select the CertificateVerify hash
* algorithm here to avoid tracking the other hash algorithms unnecessarily?
*/
TlsUtilities.TrackHashAlgorithms(handshake.HandshakeHash,
state.certificateRequest.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms);
serverMessage = handshake.ReceiveMessage();
}
else
{
// Okay, CertificateRequest is optional
}
if (serverMessage.Type == HandshakeType.server_hello_done)
{
if (serverMessage.Body.Length != 0)
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.decode_error);
}
}
else
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
handshake.HandshakeHash.SealHashAlgorithms();
IList clientSupplementalData = state.client.GetClientSupplementalData();
if (clientSupplementalData != null)
{
byte[] supplementalDataBody = GenerateSupplementalData(clientSupplementalData);
handshake.SendMessage(HandshakeType.supplemental_data, supplementalDataBody);
}
if (state.certificateRequest != null)
{
state.clientCredentials = state.authentication.GetClientCredentials(state.certificateRequest);
/*
* RFC 5246 If no suitable certificate is available, the client MUST send a certificate
* message containing no certificates.
*
* NOTE: In previous RFCs, this was SHOULD instead of MUST.
*/
Certificate clientCertificate = null;
if (state.clientCredentials != null)
{
clientCertificate = state.clientCredentials.Certificate;
}
if (clientCertificate == null)
{
clientCertificate = Certificate.EmptyChain;
}
byte[] certificateBody = GenerateCertificate(clientCertificate);
handshake.SendMessage(HandshakeType.certificate, certificateBody);
}
if (state.clientCredentials != null)
{
state.keyExchange.ProcessClientCredentials(state.clientCredentials);
}
else
{
state.keyExchange.SkipClientCredentials();
}
byte[] clientKeyExchangeBody = GenerateClientKeyExchange(state);
handshake.SendMessage(HandshakeType.client_key_exchange, clientKeyExchangeBody);
TlsHandshakeHash prepareFinishHash = handshake.PrepareToFinish();
securityParameters.sessionHash = TlsProtocol.GetCurrentPrfHash(state.clientContext, prepareFinishHash, null);
TlsProtocol.EstablishMasterSecret(state.clientContext, state.keyExchange);
recordLayer.InitPendingEpoch(state.client.GetCipher());
if (state.clientCredentials != null && state.clientCredentials is TlsSignerCredentials)
{
TlsSignerCredentials signerCredentials = (TlsSignerCredentials)state.clientCredentials;
/*
* RFC 5246 4.7. digitally-signed element needs SignatureAndHashAlgorithm from TLS 1.2
*/
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm signatureAndHashAlgorithm = TlsUtilities.GetSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(
state.clientContext, signerCredentials);
byte[] hash;
if (signatureAndHashAlgorithm == null)
{
hash = securityParameters.SessionHash;
}
else
{
hash = prepareFinishHash.GetFinalHash(signatureAndHashAlgorithm.Hash);
}
byte[] signature = signerCredentials.GenerateCertificateSignature(hash);
DigitallySigned certificateVerify = new DigitallySigned(signatureAndHashAlgorithm, signature);
byte[] certificateVerifyBody = GenerateCertificateVerify(state, certificateVerify);
handshake.SendMessage(HandshakeType.certificate_verify, certificateVerifyBody);
}
// NOTE: Calculated exclusive of the Finished message itself
byte[] clientVerifyData = TlsUtilities.CalculateVerifyData(state.clientContext, ExporterLabel.client_finished,
TlsProtocol.GetCurrentPrfHash(state.clientContext, handshake.HandshakeHash, null));
handshake.SendMessage(HandshakeType.finished, clientVerifyData);
if (state.expectSessionTicket)
{
serverMessage = handshake.ReceiveMessage();
if (serverMessage.Type == HandshakeType.session_ticket)
{
ProcessNewSessionTicket(state, serverMessage.Body);
}
else
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
}
// NOTE: Calculated exclusive of the actual Finished message from the server
byte[] expectedServerVerifyData = TlsUtilities.CalculateVerifyData(state.clientContext, ExporterLabel.server_finished,
TlsProtocol.GetCurrentPrfHash(state.clientContext, handshake.HandshakeHash, null));
ProcessFinished(handshake.ReceiveMessageBody(HandshakeType.finished), expectedServerVerifyData);
handshake.Finish();
if (state.tlsSession != null)
{
state.sessionParameters = new SessionParameters.Builder()
.SetCipherSuite(securityParameters.CipherSuite)
.SetCompressionAlgorithm(securityParameters.CompressionAlgorithm)
.SetMasterSecret(securityParameters.MasterSecret)
.SetPeerCertificate(serverCertificate)
.SetPskIdentity(securityParameters.PskIdentity)
.SetSrpIdentity(securityParameters.SrpIdentity)
// TODO Consider filtering extensions that aren't relevant to resumed sessions
.SetServerExtensions(state.serverExtensions)
.Build();
state.tlsSession = TlsUtilities.ImportSession(state.tlsSession.SessionID, state.sessionParameters);
state.clientContext.SetResumableSession(state.tlsSession);
}
state.client.NotifyHandshakeComplete();
return(new DtlsTransport(recordLayer));
}