internal AnonymousRequest(OpenIdProvider provider, SignedResponseRequest request)
: base(provider, request) {
Contract.Requires<ArgumentNullException>(provider != null);
Contract.Requires<ArgumentException>(!(request is CheckIdRequest), "Instantiate " + typeof(AuthenticationRequest).Name + " to handle this kind of message.");
this.positiveResponse = new IndirectSignedResponse(request);
}
internal AnonymousRequest(OpenIdProvider provider, SignedResponseRequest request)
: base(provider, request) {
Contract.Requires<ArgumentNullException>(provider != null);
Contract.Requires<ArgumentException>(!(request is CheckIdRequest));
this.positiveResponse = new IndirectSignedResponse(request);
}
public override void SetUp() {
base.SetUp();
IndirectSignedResponse responseMessage = new IndirectSignedResponse(Protocol.Default.Version, RPUri);
this.extensions = responseMessage.Extensions;
this.response = new DotNetOpenAuth.OpenId.RelyingParty.PositiveAnonymousResponse(responseMessage);
}
internal AnonymousRequest(OpenIdProvider provider, SignedResponseRequest request)
: base(provider, request) {
Requires.NotNull(provider, "provider");
Requires.True(!(request is CheckIdRequest), "request");
this.positiveResponse = new IndirectSignedResponse(request);
}
public void ProviderTest() {
var responseMessage = new IndirectSignedResponse(Protocol.V20.Version, this.returnTo);
responseMessage.ProviderEndpoint = OPUri;
var response = new PositiveAnonymousResponse(responseMessage);
Assert.IsNotNull(response.Provider);
Assert.AreEqual(OPUri, response.Provider.Uri);
Assert.AreEqual(responseMessage.Version, response.Provider.Version);
}
internal AnonymousRequest(OpenIdProvider provider, SignedResponseRequest request)
: base(provider, request)
{
Contract.Requires(provider != null);
Contract.Requires(!(request is CheckIdRequest), "Instantiate " + typeof(AuthenticationRequest).Name + " to handle this kind of message.");
ErrorUtilities.VerifyInternal(!(request is CheckIdRequest), "Instantiate {0} to handle this kind of message.", typeof(AuthenticationRequest).Name);
this.positiveResponse = new IndirectSignedResponse(request);
}
/// <summary>
/// Analyzes an incoming request message payload to discover what kind of
/// message is embedded in it and returns the type, or null if no match is found.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="recipient">The intended or actual recipient of the request message.</param>
/// <param name="fields">The name/value pairs that make up the message payload.</param>
/// <returns>
/// A newly instantiated <see cref="IProtocolMessage"/>-derived object that this message can
/// deserialize to. Null if the request isn't recognized as a valid protocol message.
/// </returns>
public IDirectedProtocolMessage GetNewRequestMessage(MessageReceivingEndpoint recipient, IDictionary<string, string> fields)
{
ErrorUtilities.VerifyArgumentNotNull(recipient, "recipient");
ErrorUtilities.VerifyArgumentNotNull(fields, "fields");
RequestBase message = null;
// Discern the OpenID version of the message.
Protocol protocol = Protocol.V11;
string ns;
if (fields.TryGetValue(Protocol.V20.openid.ns, out ns)) {
ErrorUtilities.VerifyProtocol(string.Equals(ns, Protocol.OpenId2Namespace, StringComparison.Ordinal), MessagingStrings.UnexpectedMessagePartValue, Protocol.V20.openid.ns, ns);
protocol = Protocol.V20;
}
string mode;
if (fields.TryGetValue(protocol.openid.mode, out mode)) {
if (string.Equals(mode, protocol.Args.Mode.associate)) {
if (fields.ContainsKey(protocol.openid.dh_consumer_public)) {
message = new AssociateDiffieHellmanRequest(protocol.Version, recipient.Location);
} else {
message = new AssociateUnencryptedRequest(protocol.Version, recipient.Location);
}
} else if (string.Equals(mode, protocol.Args.Mode.checkid_setup) ||
string.Equals(mode, protocol.Args.Mode.checkid_immediate)) {
AuthenticationRequestMode authMode = string.Equals(mode, protocol.Args.Mode.checkid_immediate) ? AuthenticationRequestMode.Immediate : AuthenticationRequestMode.Setup;
if (fields.ContainsKey(protocol.openid.identity)) {
message = new CheckIdRequest(protocol.Version, recipient.Location, authMode);
} else {
ErrorUtilities.VerifyProtocol(!fields.ContainsKey(protocol.openid.claimed_id), OpenIdStrings.IdentityAndClaimedIdentifierMustBeBothPresentOrAbsent);
message = new SignedResponseRequest(protocol.Version, recipient.Location, authMode);
}
} else if (string.Equals(mode, protocol.Args.Mode.cancel) ||
(string.Equals(mode, protocol.Args.Mode.setup_needed) && (protocol.Version.Major >= 2 || fields.ContainsKey(protocol.openid.user_setup_url)))) {
message = new NegativeAssertionResponse(protocol.Version, recipient.Location, mode);
} else if (string.Equals(mode, protocol.Args.Mode.id_res)) {
if (fields.ContainsKey(protocol.openid.identity)) {
message = new PositiveAssertionResponse(protocol.Version, recipient.Location);
} else {
ErrorUtilities.VerifyProtocol(!fields.ContainsKey(protocol.openid.claimed_id), OpenIdStrings.IdentityAndClaimedIdentifierMustBeBothPresentOrAbsent);
message = new IndirectSignedResponse(protocol.Version, recipient.Location);
}
} else if (string.Equals(mode, protocol.Args.Mode.check_authentication)) {
message = new CheckAuthenticationRequest(protocol.Version, recipient.Location);
} else if (string.Equals(mode, protocol.Args.Mode.error)) {
message = new IndirectErrorResponse(protocol.Version, recipient.Location);
} else {
ErrorUtilities.ThrowProtocol(MessagingStrings.UnexpectedMessagePartValue, protocol.openid.mode, mode);
}
}
if (message != null) {
message.SetAsIncoming();
}
return message;
}
public override void SetUp() {
base.SetUp();
this.protocol = Protocol.V20;
this.request = new CheckIdRequest(this.protocol.Version, OPUri, AuthenticationRequestMode.Setup);
this.request.ReturnTo = RPUri;
this.response = new IndirectSignedResponse(this.request);
this.unsolicited = new IndirectSignedResponse(this.protocol.Version, RPUri);
}
public void CtorAndProperties() {
var responseMessage = new IndirectSignedResponse(Protocol.V20.Version, this.returnTo);
var ext = new ClaimsResponse();
responseMessage.Extensions.Add(ext);
var response = new PositiveAnonymousResponse(responseMessage);
Assert.AreEqual(AuthenticationStatus.ExtensionsOnly, response.Status);
Assert.AreSame(responseMessage, response.Response);
Assert.IsNull(response.ClaimedIdentifier);
Assert.IsNull(response.FriendlyIdentifierForDisplay);
Assert.IsNull(response.Exception);
Assert.IsNull(response.Provider);
Assert.AreSame(ext, response.GetUntrustedExtension<ClaimsResponse>());
}
/// <summary>
/// Initializes a new instance of the <see cref="CheckAuthenticationRequest"/> class
/// based on the contents of some signed message whose signature must be verified.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="message">The message whose signature should be verified.</param>
/// <param name="channel">The channel. This is used only within the constructor and is not stored in a field.</param>
internal CheckAuthenticationRequest(IndirectSignedResponse message, Channel channel)
: base(message.Version, message.ProviderEndpoint, GetProtocolConstant(message.Version, p => p.Args.Mode.check_authentication), MessageTransport.Direct) {
Requires.NotNull(channel, "channel");
// Copy all message parts from the id_res message into this one,
// except for the openid.mode parameter.
MessageDictionary checkPayload = channel.MessageDescriptions.GetAccessor(message, true);
MessageDictionary thisPayload = channel.MessageDescriptions.GetAccessor(this);
foreach (var pair in checkPayload) {
if (!string.Equals(pair.Key, this.Protocol.openid.mode)) {
thisPayload[pair.Key] = pair.Value;
}
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Initializes a new instance of the <see cref="CheckAuthenticationResponseProvider"/> class.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="request">The request that this message is responding to.</param>
/// <param name="provider">The OpenID Provider that is preparing to send this response.</param>
internal CheckAuthenticationResponseProvider(CheckAuthenticationRequest request, OpenIdProvider provider)
: base(request.Version, request) {
Requires.NotNull(provider, "provider");
// The channel's binding elements have already set the request's IsValid property
// appropriately. We just copy it into the response message.
this.IsValid = request.IsValid;
// Confirm the RP should invalidate the association handle only if the association
// is not valid (any longer). OpenID 2.0 section 11.4.2.2.
IndirectSignedResponse signedResponse = new IndirectSignedResponse(request, provider.Channel);
string invalidateHandle = ((ITamperResistantOpenIdMessage)signedResponse).InvalidateHandle;
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(invalidateHandle) && !provider.AssociationStore.IsValid(signedResponse, false, invalidateHandle)) {
this.InvalidateHandle = invalidateHandle;
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Initializes a new instance of the <see cref="CheckAuthenticationResponse"/> class
/// for use by the Provider.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="request">The request that this message is responding to.</param>
/// <param name="provider">The OpenID Provider that is preparing to send this response.</param>
internal CheckAuthenticationResponse(CheckAuthenticationRequest request, OpenIdProvider provider)
: base(request.Version, request) {
Contract.Requires<ArgumentNullException>(provider != null);
// The channel's binding elements have already set the request's IsValid property
// appropriately. We just copy it into the response message.
this.IsValid = request.IsValid;
// Confirm the RP should invalidate the association handle only if the association
// really doesn't exist. OpenID 2.0 section 11.4.2.2.
IndirectSignedResponse signedResponse = new IndirectSignedResponse(request, provider.Channel);
string invalidateHandle = ((ITamperResistantOpenIdMessage)signedResponse).InvalidateHandle;
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(invalidateHandle) && provider.AssociationStore.GetAssociation(AssociationRelyingPartyType.Smart, invalidateHandle) == null) {
this.InvalidateHandle = invalidateHandle;
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Initializes a new instance of the <see cref="CheckAuthenticationRequest"/> class
/// based on the contents of some signed message whose signature must be verified.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="message">The message whose signature should be verified.</param>
internal CheckAuthenticationRequest(IndirectSignedResponse message)
: base(message.Version, message.ProviderEndpoint, GetProtocolConstant(message.Version, p => p.Args.Mode.check_authentication), MessageTransport.Direct)
{
// Copy all message parts from the id_res message into this one,
// except for the openid.mode parameter.
MessageDictionary checkPayload = new MessageDictionary(message);
MessageDictionary thisPayload = new MessageDictionary(this);
foreach (var pair in checkPayload)
{
if (!string.Equals(pair.Key, this.Protocol.openid.mode))
{
thisPayload[pair.Key] = pair.Value;
}
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Initializes a new instance of the <see cref="CheckAuthenticationRequest"/> class
/// based on the contents of some signed message whose signature must be verified.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="message">The message whose signature should be verified.</param>
/// <param name="channel">The channel. This is used only within the constructor and is not stored in a field.</param>
internal CheckAuthenticationRequest(IndirectSignedResponse message, Channel channel)
: base(message.Version, message.ProviderEndpoint, GetProtocolConstant(message.Version, p => p.Args.Mode.check_authentication), MessageTransport.Direct)
{
Contract.Requires <ArgumentNullException>(channel != null);
// Copy all message parts from the id_res message into this one,
// except for the openid.mode parameter.
MessageDictionary checkPayload = channel.MessageDescriptions.GetAccessor(message, true);
MessageDictionary thisPayload = channel.MessageDescriptions.GetAccessor(this);
foreach (var pair in checkPayload)
{
if (!string.Equals(pair.Key, this.Protocol.openid.mode))
{
thisPayload[pair.Key] = pair.Value;
}
}
}
public void SignaturesMatchKnownGood() {
Protocol protocol = Protocol.V20;
var settings = new ProviderSecuritySettings();
var store = new AssociationMemoryStore<AssociationRelyingPartyType>();
byte[] associationSecret = Convert.FromBase64String("rsSwv1zPWfjPRQU80hciu8FPDC+GONAMJQ/AvSo1a2M=");
Association association = HmacShaAssociation.Create("mock", associationSecret, TimeSpan.FromDays(1));
store.StoreAssociation(AssociationRelyingPartyType.Smart, association);
SigningBindingElement signer = new SigningBindingElement(store, settings);
signer.Channel = new TestChannel(this.MessageDescriptions);
IndirectSignedResponse message = new IndirectSignedResponse(protocol.Version, new Uri("http://rp"));
ITamperResistantOpenIdMessage signedMessage = message;
message.ProviderEndpoint = new Uri("http://provider");
signedMessage.UtcCreationDate = DateTime.Parse("1/1/2009");
signedMessage.AssociationHandle = association.Handle;
Assert.IsNotNull(signer.ProcessOutgoingMessage(message));
Assert.AreEqual("o9+uN7qTaUS9v0otbHTuNAtbkpBm14+es9QnNo6IHD4=", signedMessage.Signature);
}
/// <summary>
/// Initializes a new instance of the <see cref="CheckAuthenticationResponse"/> class
/// for use by the Provider.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="request">The request that this message is responding to.</param>
/// <param name="provider">The OpenID Provider that is preparing to send this response.</param>
internal CheckAuthenticationResponse(CheckAuthenticationRequest request, OpenIdProvider provider)
: base(request.Version, request)
{
ErrorUtilities.VerifyArgumentNotNull(provider, "provider");
// The channel's binding elements have already set the request's IsValid property
// appropriately. We just copy it into the response message.
this.IsValid = request.IsValid;
// Confirm the RP should invalidate the association handle only if the association
// really doesn't exist. OpenID 2.0 section 11.4.2.2.
IndirectSignedResponse signedResponse = new IndirectSignedResponse(request);
string invalidateHandle = ((ITamperResistantOpenIdMessage)signedResponse).InvalidateHandle;
if (invalidateHandle != null && provider.AssociationStore.GetAssociation(AssociationRelyingPartyType.Smart, invalidateHandle) == null)
{
this.InvalidateHandle = invalidateHandle;
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Initializes a new instance of the <see cref="CheckAuthenticationResponseProvider"/> class.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="request">The request that this message is responding to.</param>
/// <param name="provider">The OpenID Provider that is preparing to send this response.</param>
internal CheckAuthenticationResponseProvider(CheckAuthenticationRequest request, OpenIdProvider provider)
: base(request.Version, request)
{
Requires.NotNull(provider, "provider");
// The channel's binding elements have already set the request's IsValid property
// appropriately. We just copy it into the response message.
this.IsValid = request.IsValid;
// Confirm the RP should invalidate the association handle only if the association
// is not valid (any longer). OpenID 2.0 section 11.4.2.2.
IndirectSignedResponse signedResponse = new IndirectSignedResponse(request, provider.Channel);
string invalidateHandle = ((ITamperResistantOpenIdMessage)signedResponse).InvalidateHandle;
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(invalidateHandle) && !provider.AssociationStore.IsValid(signedResponse, false, invalidateHandle))
{
this.InvalidateHandle = invalidateHandle;
}
}
public void SignaturesMatchKnownGood() {
Protocol protocol = Protocol.V20;
var settings = new ProviderSecuritySettings();
var cryptoStore = new MemoryCryptoKeyStore();
byte[] associationSecret = Convert.FromBase64String("rsSwv1zPWfjPRQU80hciu8FPDC+GONAMJQ/AvSo1a2M=");
string handle = "mock";
cryptoStore.StoreKey(ProviderAssociationKeyStorage.SharedAssociationBucket, handle, new CryptoKey(associationSecret, DateTime.UtcNow.AddDays(1)));
var store = new ProviderAssociationKeyStorage(cryptoStore);
SigningBindingElement signer = new ProviderSigningBindingElement(store, settings);
signer.Channel = new TestChannel(this.MessageDescriptions);
IndirectSignedResponse message = new IndirectSignedResponse(protocol.Version, new Uri("http://rp"));
ITamperResistantOpenIdMessage signedMessage = message;
message.ProviderEndpoint = new Uri("http://provider");
signedMessage.UtcCreationDate = DateTime.Parse("1/1/2009");
signedMessage.AssociationHandle = handle;
Assert.IsNotNull(signer.ProcessOutgoingMessage(message));
Assert.AreEqual("o9+uN7qTaUS9v0otbHTuNAtbkpBm14+es9QnNo6IHD4=", signedMessage.Signature);
}
public void GetReturnToArgumentAndNames()
{
UriBuilder returnToBuilder = new UriBuilder(this.response.ReturnTo);
returnToBuilder.AppendQueryArgs(new Dictionary<string, string> { { "a", "b" } });
this.request.ReturnTo = returnToBuilder.Uri;
// First pretend that the return_to args were signed.
this.response = new IndirectSignedResponse(this.request);
this.response.ReturnToParametersSignatureValidated = true;
Assert.AreEqual(1, this.response.GetReturnToParameterNames().Count());
Assert.IsTrue(this.response.GetReturnToParameterNames().Contains("a"));
Assert.AreEqual("b", this.response.GetReturnToArgument("a"));
// Now simulate them NOT being signed. They should still be visible at this level.
this.response = new IndirectSignedResponse(this.request);
this.response.ReturnToParametersSignatureValidated = false;
Assert.AreEqual(1, this.response.GetReturnToParameterNames().Count());
Assert.IsTrue(this.response.GetReturnToParameterNames().Contains("a"));
Assert.AreEqual("b", this.response.GetReturnToArgument("a"));
}
public void SignedResponsesIncludeExtraDataInSignature() {
Protocol protocol = Protocol.Default;
SigningBindingElement sbe = new ProviderSigningBindingElement(new ProviderAssociationHandleEncoder(new MemoryCryptoKeyStore()), new ProviderSecuritySettings());
sbe.Channel = new TestChannel(this.MessageDescriptions);
IndirectSignedResponse response = new IndirectSignedResponse(protocol.Version, RPUri);
response.ReturnTo = RPUri;
response.ProviderEndpoint = OPUri;
response.ExtraData["someunsigned"] = "value";
response.ExtraData["openid.somesigned"] = "value";
Assert.IsNotNull(sbe.ProcessOutgoingMessage(response));
ITamperResistantOpenIdMessage signedResponse = (ITamperResistantOpenIdMessage)response;
// Make sure that the extra parameters are signed.
// Since the signing algorithm only allows for signing parameters that start with
// 'openid.', other parameters should not be signed.
Assert.IsNotNull(signedResponse.SignedParameterOrder);
string[] signedParameters = signedResponse.SignedParameterOrder.Split(',');
Assert.IsTrue(signedParameters.Contains("somesigned"));
Assert.IsFalse(signedParameters.Contains("someunsigned"));
}
/// <summary>
/// Creates a response message with one extensions.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="protocol">The protocol to construct the message with.</param>
/// <returns>The message ready to send from OP to RP.</returns>
private IndirectSignedResponse CreateResponseWithExtensions(Protocol protocol)
{
ErrorUtilities.VerifyArgumentNotNull(protocol, "protocol");
IndirectSignedResponse response = new IndirectSignedResponse(protocol.Version, RPUri);
response.ProviderEndpoint = OPUri;
response.Extensions.Add(new MockOpenIdExtension("pv", "ev"));
return response;
}
public void MissingSignedParameter() {
var cryptoStore = new MemoryCryptoKeyStore();
byte[] associationSecret = Convert.FromBase64String("rsSwv1zPWfjPRQU80hciu8FPDC+GONAMJQ/AvSo1a2M=");
string handle = "{634477555066085461}{TTYcIg==}{32}";
cryptoStore.StoreKey(ProviderAssociationKeyStorage.PrivateAssociationBucket, handle, new CryptoKey(associationSecret, DateTime.UtcNow.AddDays(1)));
var signer = new ProviderSigningBindingElement(new ProviderAssociationKeyStorage(cryptoStore), new ProviderSecuritySettings());
var testChannel = new TestChannel(new OpenIdProviderMessageFactory());
signer.Channel = testChannel;
var buggyRPMessage = new Dictionary<string, string>() {
{ "openid.assoc_handle", "{634477555066085461}{TTYcIg==}{32}" },
{ "openid.claimed_id", "https://openid.stackexchange.com/user/f5e91123-e5b4-43c5-871f-5f276c75d31a" },
{ "openid.identity", "https://openid.stackexchange.com/user/f5e91123-e5b4-43c5-871f-5f276c75d31a" },
{ "openid.mode", "check_authentication" },
{ "openid.op_endpoint", "https://openid.stackexchange.com/openid/provider" },
{ "openid.response_nonce", "2011-08-01T00:32:10Zvdyt3efw" },
{ "openid.return_to", "http://openid-consumer.appspot.com/finish?session_id=1543025&janrain_nonce=2011-08-01T00%3A32%3A09ZIPGz7D" },
{ "openid.sig", "b0Rll6Kt1KKBWWBEg/qBvW3sQYtmhOUmpI0/UREBVZ0=" },
{ "openid.signed", "claimed_id,identity,assoc_handle,op_endpoint,return_to,response_nonce,ns.sreg,sreg.email,sreg.fullname" },
{ "openid.sreg.email", "*****@*****.**" },
{ "openid.sreg.fullname", "Kevin K Montrose" },
};
var message = (CheckAuthenticationRequest)testChannel.Receive(buggyRPMessage, new MessageReceivingEndpoint(OPUri, HttpDeliveryMethods.PostRequest));
var originalResponse = new IndirectSignedResponse(message, signer.Channel);
signer.ProcessIncomingMessage(originalResponse);
}
/// <summary>
/// Creates a response message with one extensions.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="protocol">The protocol to construct the message with.</param>
/// <returns>The message ready to send from OP to RP.</returns>
private IndirectSignedResponse CreateResponseWithExtensions(Protocol protocol) {
Requires.NotNull(protocol, "protocol");
var response = new IndirectSignedResponse(protocol.Version, RPUri);
response.ProviderEndpoint = OPUri;
response.Extensions.Add(new MockOpenIdExtension("pv", "ev"));
return response;
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies the integrity and applicability of an incoming message.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="message">The message just received.</param>
/// <param name="cancellationToken">The cancellation token.</param>
/// <returns>
/// A task that completes with the asynchronous operation.
/// </returns>
/// <exception cref="ProtocolException">Thrown when the message is somehow invalid, except for check_authentication messages.
/// This can be due to tampering, replay attack or expiration, among other things.</exception>
protected override async Task ProcessIncomingMessageAsync(IProtocolMessage message, CancellationToken cancellationToken) {
var checkAuthRequest = message as CheckAuthenticationRequest;
if (checkAuthRequest != null) {
IndirectSignedResponse originalResponse = new IndirectSignedResponse(checkAuthRequest, this);
try {
await base.ProcessIncomingMessageAsync(originalResponse, cancellationToken);
checkAuthRequest.IsValid = true;
} catch (ProtocolException) {
checkAuthRequest.IsValid = false;
}
} else {
await base.ProcessIncomingMessageAsync(message, cancellationToken);
}
// Convert an OpenID indirect error message, which we never expect
// between two good OpenID implementations, into an exception.
// We don't process DirectErrorResponse because associate negotiations
// commonly get a derivative of that message type and handle it.
var errorMessage = message as IndirectErrorResponse;
if (errorMessage != null) {
string exceptionMessage = string.Format(
CultureInfo.CurrentCulture,
OpenIdStrings.IndirectErrorFormattedMessage,
errorMessage.ErrorMessage,
errorMessage.Contact,
errorMessage.Reference);
throw new ProtocolException(exceptionMessage, message);
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Determines whether the relying party sending an authentication request is
/// vulnerable to replay attacks.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="request">The request message from the Relying Party. Useful, but may be null for conservative estimate results.</param>
/// <param name="response">The response message to be signed.</param>
/// <returns>
/// <c>true</c> if the relying party is vulnerable; otherwise, <c>false</c>.
/// </returns>
private static bool IsRelyingPartyVulnerableToReplays(SignedResponseRequest request, IndirectSignedResponse response) {
Contract.Requires<ArgumentNullException>(response != null);
// OpenID 2.0 includes replay protection as part of the protocol.
if (response.Version.Major >= 2) {
return false;
}
// This library's RP may be on the remote end, and may be using 1.x merely because
// discovery on the Claimed Identifier suggested this was a 1.x OP.
// Since this library's RP has a built-in request_nonce parameter for replay
// protection, we'll allow for that.
var returnToArgs = HttpUtility.ParseQueryString(response.ReturnTo.Query);
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(returnToArgs[ReturnToNonceBindingElement.NonceParameter])) {
return false;
}
// If the OP endpoint _AND_ RP return_to URL uses HTTPS then no one
// can steal and replay the positive assertion.
// We can only ascertain this if the request message was handed to us
// so we know what our own OP endpoint is. If we don't have a request
// message, then we'll default to assuming it's insecure.
if (request != null) {
if (request.Recipient.IsTransportSecure() && response.Recipient.IsTransportSecure()) {
return false;
}
}
// Nothing left to protect against replays. RP is vulnerable.
return true;
}
/// <summary>
/// Creates a response message with one extensions.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="protocol">The protocol to construct the message with.</param>
/// <returns>The message ready to send from OP to RP.</returns>
private IndirectSignedResponse CreateResponseWithExtensions(Protocol protocol) {
Contract.Requires<ArgumentNullException>(protocol != null);
IndirectSignedResponse response = new IndirectSignedResponse(protocol.Version, RPUri);
response.ProviderEndpoint = OPUri;
response.Extensions.Add(new MockOpenIdExtension("pv", "ev"));
return response;
}
