private static void TestManagedKeyDerivation(byte[] kdk, byte[] label, byte[] contextHeader, byte[] context, int numDerivedBytes, string expectedDerivedSubkeyAsBase64)
{
var labelSegment = new ArraySegment <byte>(new byte[label.Length + 10], 3, label.Length);
Buffer.BlockCopy(label, 0, labelSegment.Array, labelSegment.Offset, labelSegment.Count);
var contextSegment = new ArraySegment <byte>(new byte[context.Length + 10], 5, context.Length);
Buffer.BlockCopy(context, 0, contextSegment.Array, contextSegment.Offset, contextSegment.Count);
var derivedSubkeySegment = new ArraySegment <byte>(new byte[numDerivedBytes + 10], 4, numDerivedBytes);
ManagedSP800_108_CTR_HMACSHA512.DeriveKeysWithContextHeader(kdk, labelSegment, contextHeader, contextSegment,
bytes => new HMACSHA512(bytes), derivedSubkeySegment);
Assert.Equal(expectedDerivedSubkeyAsBase64, Convert.ToBase64String(derivedSubkeySegment.AsStandaloneArray()));
}
public byte[] Encrypt(ArraySegment <byte> plaintext, ArraySegment <byte> additionalAuthenticatedData)
{
plaintext.Validate();
additionalAuthenticatedData.Validate();
try
{
var outputStream = new MemoryStream();
// Step 1: Generate a random key modifier and IV for this operation.
// Both will be equal to the block size of the block cipher algorithm.
byte[] keyModifier = _genRandom.GenRandom(KEY_MODIFIER_SIZE_IN_BYTES);
byte[] iv = _genRandom.GenRandom(_symmetricAlgorithmBlockSizeInBytes);
// Step 2: Copy the key modifier and the IV to the output stream since they'll act as a header.
outputStream.Write(keyModifier, 0, keyModifier.Length);
outputStream.Write(iv, 0, iv.Length);
// At this point, outputStream := { keyModifier || IV }.
// Step 3: Decrypt the KDK, and use it to generate new encryption and HMAC keys.
// We pin all unencrypted keys to limit their exposure via GC relocation.
byte[] decryptedKdk = new byte[_keyDerivationKey.Length];
byte[] encryptionSubkey = new byte[_symmetricAlgorithmSubkeyLengthInBytes];
byte[] validationSubkey = new byte[_validationAlgorithmSubkeyLengthInBytes];
byte[] derivedKeysBuffer = new byte[checked (encryptionSubkey.Length + validationSubkey.Length)];
fixed(byte *__unused__1 = decryptedKdk)
fixed(byte *__unused__2 = encryptionSubkey)
fixed(byte *__unused__3 = validationSubkey)
fixed(byte *__unused__4 = derivedKeysBuffer)
{
try
{
_keyDerivationKey.WriteSecretIntoBuffer(new ArraySegment <byte>(decryptedKdk));
ManagedSP800_108_CTR_HMACSHA512.DeriveKeysWithContextHeader(
kdk: decryptedKdk,
label: additionalAuthenticatedData,
contextHeader: _contextHeader,
context: new ArraySegment <byte>(keyModifier),
prfFactory: _kdkPrfFactory,
output: new ArraySegment <byte>(derivedKeysBuffer));
Buffer.BlockCopy(derivedKeysBuffer, 0, encryptionSubkey, 0, encryptionSubkey.Length);
Buffer.BlockCopy(derivedKeysBuffer, encryptionSubkey.Length, validationSubkey, 0, validationSubkey.Length);
// Step 4: Perform the encryption operation.
using (var symmetricAlgorithm = CreateSymmetricAlgorithm())
using (var cryptoTransform = symmetricAlgorithm.CreateEncryptor(encryptionSubkey, iv))
using (var cryptoStream = new CryptoStream(outputStream, cryptoTransform, CryptoStreamMode.Write))
{
cryptoStream.Write(plaintext.Array, plaintext.Offset, plaintext.Count);
cryptoStream.FlushFinalBlock();
// At this point, outputStream := { keyModifier || IV || ciphertext }
// Step 5: Calculate the digest over the IV and ciphertext.
// We don't need to calculate the digest over the key modifier since that
// value has already been mixed into the KDF used to generate the MAC key.
using (var validationAlgorithm = CreateValidationAlgorithm(validationSubkey))
{
#if !DOTNET5_4
// As an optimization, avoid duplicating the underlying buffer if we're on desktop CLR.
byte[] underlyingBuffer = outputStream.GetBuffer();
#else
byte[] underlyingBuffer = outputStream.ToArray();
#endif
byte[] mac = validationAlgorithm.ComputeHash(underlyingBuffer, KEY_MODIFIER_SIZE_IN_BYTES, checked ((int)outputStream.Length - KEY_MODIFIER_SIZE_IN_BYTES));
outputStream.Write(mac, 0, mac.Length);
// At this point, outputStream := { keyModifier || IV || ciphertext || MAC(IV || ciphertext) }
// And we're done!
return(outputStream.ToArray());
}
}
}
finally
{
// delete since these contain secret material
Array.Clear(decryptedKdk, 0, decryptedKdk.Length);
Array.Clear(encryptionSubkey, 0, encryptionSubkey.Length);
Array.Clear(validationSubkey, 0, validationSubkey.Length);
Array.Clear(derivedKeysBuffer, 0, derivedKeysBuffer.Length);
}
}
}
catch (Exception ex) when(ex.RequiresHomogenization())
{
// Homogenize all exceptions to CryptographicException.
throw Error.CryptCommon_GenericError(ex);
}
}
public byte[] Decrypt(ArraySegment <byte> ciphertext, ArraySegment <byte> additionalAuthenticatedData)
{
ciphertext.Validate();
additionalAuthenticatedData.Validate();
// Argument checking: input must at the absolute minimum contain a key modifier, nonce, and tag
if (ciphertext.Count < KEY_MODIFIER_SIZE_IN_BYTES + NONCE_SIZE_IN_BYTES + TAG_SIZE_IN_BYTES)
{
throw Error.CryptCommon_PayloadInvalid();
}
// Assumption: pbCipherText := { keyModifier || nonce || encryptedData || authenticationTag }
var plaintextBytes = ciphertext.Count - (KEY_MODIFIER_SIZE_IN_BYTES + NONCE_SIZE_IN_BYTES + TAG_SIZE_IN_BYTES);
var plaintext = new byte[plaintextBytes];
try
{
// Step 1: Extract the key modifier from the payload.
int keyModifierOffset; // position in ciphertext.Array where key modifier begins
int nonceOffset; // position in ciphertext.Array where key modifier ends / nonce begins
int encryptedDataOffset; // position in ciphertext.Array where nonce ends / encryptedData begins
int tagOffset; // position in ciphertext.Array where encrypted data ends
checked
{
keyModifierOffset = ciphertext.Offset;
nonceOffset = keyModifierOffset + KEY_MODIFIER_SIZE_IN_BYTES;
encryptedDataOffset = nonceOffset + NONCE_SIZE_IN_BYTES;
tagOffset = encryptedDataOffset + plaintextBytes;
}
var keyModifier = new ArraySegment <byte>(ciphertext.Array !, keyModifierOffset, KEY_MODIFIER_SIZE_IN_BYTES);
// Step 2: Decrypt the KDK and use it to restore the original encryption and MAC keys.
// We pin all unencrypted keys to limit their exposure via GC relocation.
var decryptedKdk = new byte[_keyDerivationKey.Length];
var derivedKey = new byte[_derivedkeySizeInBytes];
fixed(byte *__unused__1 = decryptedKdk)
fixed(byte *__unused__2 = derivedKey)
{
try
{
_keyDerivationKey.WriteSecretIntoBuffer(new ArraySegment <byte>(decryptedKdk));
ManagedSP800_108_CTR_HMACSHA512.DeriveKeysWithContextHeader(
kdk: decryptedKdk,
label: additionalAuthenticatedData,
contextHeader: _contextHeader,
context: keyModifier,
prfFactory: _kdkPrfFactory,
output: new ArraySegment <byte>(derivedKey));
// Perform the decryption operation
var nonce = new Span <byte>(ciphertext.Array, nonceOffset, NONCE_SIZE_IN_BYTES);
var tag = new Span <byte>(ciphertext.Array, tagOffset, TAG_SIZE_IN_BYTES);
var encrypted = new Span <byte>(ciphertext.Array, encryptedDataOffset, plaintextBytes);
using var aes = new AesGcm(derivedKey);
aes.Decrypt(nonce, encrypted, tag, plaintext);
return(plaintext);
}
finally
{
// delete since these contain secret material
Array.Clear(decryptedKdk, 0, decryptedKdk.Length);
Array.Clear(derivedKey, 0, derivedKey.Length);
}
}
}
catch (Exception ex) when(ex.RequiresHomogenization())
{
// Homogenize all exceptions to CryptographicException.
throw Error.CryptCommon_GenericError(ex);
}
}
public byte[] Decrypt(ArraySegment <byte> protectedPayload, ArraySegment <byte> additionalAuthenticatedData)
{
protectedPayload.Validate();
additionalAuthenticatedData.Validate();
// Argument checking - input must at the absolute minimum contain a key modifier, IV, and MAC
if (protectedPayload.Count < checked (KEY_MODIFIER_SIZE_IN_BYTES + _symmetricAlgorithmBlockSizeInBytes + _validationAlgorithmDigestLengthInBytes))
{
throw Error.CryptCommon_PayloadInvalid();
}
// Assumption: protectedPayload := { keyModifier | IV | encryptedData | MAC(IV | encryptedPayload) }
try
{
// Step 1: Extract the key modifier and IV from the payload.
int keyModifierOffset; // position in protectedPayload.Array where key modifier begins
int ivOffset; // position in protectedPayload.Array where key modifier ends / IV begins
int ciphertextOffset; // position in protectedPayload.Array where IV ends / ciphertext begins
int macOffset; // position in protectedPayload.Array where ciphertext ends / MAC begins
int eofOffset; // position in protectedPayload.Array where MAC ends
checked
{
keyModifierOffset = protectedPayload.Offset;
ivOffset = keyModifierOffset + KEY_MODIFIER_SIZE_IN_BYTES;
ciphertextOffset = ivOffset + _symmetricAlgorithmBlockSizeInBytes;
}
ArraySegment <byte> keyModifier = new ArraySegment <byte>(protectedPayload.Array, keyModifierOffset, ivOffset - keyModifierOffset);
byte[] iv = new byte[_symmetricAlgorithmBlockSizeInBytes];
Buffer.BlockCopy(protectedPayload.Array, ivOffset, iv, 0, iv.Length);
// Step 2: Decrypt the KDK and use it to restore the original encryption and MAC keys.
// We pin all unencrypted keys to limit their exposure via GC relocation.
byte[] decryptedKdk = new byte[_keyDerivationKey.Length];
byte[] decryptionSubkey = new byte[_symmetricAlgorithmSubkeyLengthInBytes];
byte[] validationSubkey = new byte[_validationAlgorithmSubkeyLengthInBytes];
byte[] derivedKeysBuffer = new byte[checked (decryptionSubkey.Length + validationSubkey.Length)];
fixed(byte *__unused__1 = decryptedKdk)
fixed(byte *__unused__2 = decryptionSubkey)
fixed(byte *__unused__3 = validationSubkey)
fixed(byte *__unused__4 = derivedKeysBuffer)
{
try
{
_keyDerivationKey.WriteSecretIntoBuffer(new ArraySegment <byte>(decryptedKdk));
ManagedSP800_108_CTR_HMACSHA512.DeriveKeysWithContextHeader(
kdk: decryptedKdk,
label: additionalAuthenticatedData,
contextHeader: _contextHeader,
context: keyModifier,
prfFactory: _kdkPrfFactory,
output: new ArraySegment <byte>(derivedKeysBuffer));
Buffer.BlockCopy(derivedKeysBuffer, 0, decryptionSubkey, 0, decryptionSubkey.Length);
Buffer.BlockCopy(derivedKeysBuffer, decryptionSubkey.Length, validationSubkey, 0, validationSubkey.Length);
// Step 3: Calculate the correct MAC for this payload.
// correctHash := MAC(IV || ciphertext)
byte[] correctHash;
using (var hashAlgorithm = CreateValidationAlgorithm(validationSubkey))
{
checked
{
eofOffset = protectedPayload.Offset + protectedPayload.Count;
macOffset = eofOffset - _validationAlgorithmDigestLengthInBytes;
}
correctHash = hashAlgorithm.ComputeHash(protectedPayload.Array, ivOffset, macOffset - ivOffset);
}
// Step 4: Validate the MAC provided as part of the payload.
if (!CryptoUtil.TimeConstantBuffersAreEqual(correctHash, 0, correctHash.Length, protectedPayload.Array, macOffset, eofOffset - macOffset))
{
throw Error.CryptCommon_PayloadInvalid(); // integrity check failure
}
// Step 5: Decipher the ciphertext and return it to the caller.
using (var symmetricAlgorithm = CreateSymmetricAlgorithm())
using (var cryptoTransform = symmetricAlgorithm.CreateDecryptor(decryptionSubkey, iv))
{
var outputStream = new MemoryStream();
using (var cryptoStream = new CryptoStream(outputStream, cryptoTransform, CryptoStreamMode.Write))
{
cryptoStream.Write(protectedPayload.Array, ciphertextOffset, macOffset - ciphertextOffset);
cryptoStream.FlushFinalBlock();
// At this point, outputStream := { plaintext }, and we're done!
return(outputStream.ToArray());
}
}
}
finally
{
// delete since these contain secret material
Array.Clear(decryptedKdk, 0, decryptedKdk.Length);
Array.Clear(decryptionSubkey, 0, decryptionSubkey.Length);
Array.Clear(validationSubkey, 0, validationSubkey.Length);
Array.Clear(derivedKeysBuffer, 0, derivedKeysBuffer.Length);
}
}
}
catch (Exception ex) when(ex.RequiresHomogenization())
{
// Homogenize all exceptions to CryptographicException.
throw Error.CryptCommon_GenericError(ex);
}
}
public byte[] Encrypt(ArraySegment <byte> plaintext, ArraySegment <byte> additionalAuthenticatedData, uint preBufferSize, uint postBufferSize)
{
plaintext.Validate();
additionalAuthenticatedData.Validate();
try
{
// Allocate a buffer to hold the key modifier, nonce, encrypted data, and tag.
// In GCM, the encrypted output will be the same length as the plaintext input.
var retVal = new byte[checked (preBufferSize + KEY_MODIFIER_SIZE_IN_BYTES + NONCE_SIZE_IN_BYTES + plaintext.Count + TAG_SIZE_IN_BYTES + postBufferSize)];
int keyModifierOffset; // position in ciphertext.Array where key modifier begins
int nonceOffset; // position in ciphertext.Array where key modifier ends / nonce begins
int encryptedDataOffset; // position in ciphertext.Array where nonce ends / encryptedData begins
int tagOffset; // position in ciphertext.Array where encrypted data ends
checked
{
keyModifierOffset = plaintext.Offset + (int)preBufferSize;
nonceOffset = keyModifierOffset + KEY_MODIFIER_SIZE_IN_BYTES;
encryptedDataOffset = nonceOffset + NONCE_SIZE_IN_BYTES;
tagOffset = encryptedDataOffset + plaintext.Count;
}
// Randomly generate the key modifier and nonce
var keyModifier = _genRandom.GenRandom(KEY_MODIFIER_SIZE_IN_BYTES);
var nonceBytes = _genRandom.GenRandom(NONCE_SIZE_IN_BYTES);
Buffer.BlockCopy(keyModifier, 0, retVal, (int)preBufferSize, keyModifier.Length);
Buffer.BlockCopy(nonceBytes, 0, retVal, (int)preBufferSize + keyModifier.Length, nonceBytes.Length);
// At this point, retVal := { preBuffer | keyModifier | nonce | _____ | _____ | postBuffer }
// Use the KDF to generate a new symmetric block cipher key
// We'll need a temporary buffer to hold the symmetric encryption subkey
var decryptedKdk = new byte[_keyDerivationKey.Length];
var derivedKey = new byte[_derivedkeySizeInBytes];
fixed(byte *__unused__1 = decryptedKdk)
fixed(byte *__unused__2 = derivedKey)
{
try
{
_keyDerivationKey.WriteSecretIntoBuffer(new ArraySegment <byte>(decryptedKdk));
ManagedSP800_108_CTR_HMACSHA512.DeriveKeysWithContextHeader(
kdk: decryptedKdk,
label: additionalAuthenticatedData,
contextHeader: _contextHeader,
context: keyModifier,
prfFactory: _kdkPrfFactory,
output: new ArraySegment <byte>(derivedKey));
// do gcm
var nonce = new Span <byte>(retVal, nonceOffset, NONCE_SIZE_IN_BYTES);
var tag = new Span <byte>(retVal, tagOffset, TAG_SIZE_IN_BYTES);
var encrypted = new Span <byte>(retVal, encryptedDataOffset, plaintext.Count);
using var aes = new AesGcm(derivedKey);
aes.Encrypt(nonce, plaintext, encrypted, tag);
// At this point, retVal := { preBuffer | keyModifier | nonce | encryptedData | authenticationTag | postBuffer }
// And we're done!
return(retVal);
}
finally
{
// delete since these contain secret material
Array.Clear(decryptedKdk, 0, decryptedKdk.Length);
Array.Clear(derivedKey, 0, derivedKey.Length);
}
}
}
catch (Exception ex) when(ex.RequiresHomogenization())
{
// Homogenize all exceptions to CryptographicException.
throw Error.CryptCommon_GenericError(ex);
}
}